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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
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)
)
)
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Supreme Court No. 38534-2011

)

)
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
)
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
)
INC.,
)
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-------------------------)
CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Before HONORABLE Stephen S. Dunn District Judge.
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Case: CV-2010-0002757-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, etal.

Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc.
Date

Code

User

6/30/2010

LOCT

MEGAN

NCOC

MEGAN

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Stephen S Dunn

COMP

MEGAN

Complaint Filed

Stephen S Dunn

SMIS

MEGAN

Summons Issued

Stephen S Dunn

MEGAN

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Stephen S Dunn
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: Cooper & Larsen Receipt
number: 0023393 Dated: 6/30/2010 Amount:
$88.00 (Check) For:

CAMILLE

Plaintiff: Mickelsen Construction, Inc. Attorney
Retained Gary L Cooper

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Return of service - srvd on Lesa Horrocks on
7-13-2010 (summons and complaint)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Return of service - srvd on Sunshine Secretarial
Services, thru Lesa Horrocks on 7-13-2010

Stephen S Dunn

MEGAN

Stephen S Dunn
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Maguire &
Penrod Receipt number: 0026797 Dated:
7/30/2010 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For:
Horrocks, Lesa Darlene (defendant) and
Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. (defendant)

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: Horrocks, Lesa Darlene Attorney
Retained David K. Penrod

Stephen S Dunn

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc.
Attorney Retained David K. Penrod

Stephen S Dunn

ORDR

KARLA

Order for Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order /s J Dunn 08/06/10

Stephen S Dunn

8/20/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Service - discovery to Defs: aty Gary
Cooper for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

8/23/2010

CAMILLE

Response to Order for Submission of Information Stephen S Dunn
for Scheduling Order; aty Gary Cooper for plntf

OR DR

KARLA

Order setting Jury Trial /s J Dunn 09/02/10

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/12/2011 09:00 Stephen S Dunn
AM)

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/17/2011 09:00 Stephen S Dunn
AM)

9/30/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Substitution of counsel; aty David
Penrod

Stephen S Dunn

10/1/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Substitution of counsel; aty David
Penrog

Stephen S Dunn

10/13/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Response to Plaintiffs request Stephen S Dunn
for Admissions: aty aaron Thompson

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Response to Plntfs discovery
to Defendant: aty Aaron Thompson

ATIR
7/22/2010

8/10/2010

9/3/2010

Judge
clerks office

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

s
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Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc.
Date

Code

Judge

User

10/18/2010

CAMILLE

Motion to extend scheduling order RE: Deadline
to add new parties or amend the pleadings;
aty Aaron Thompson

10/19/2010

CAMILLE

Motion to extend scheduling order re: Deadline to Stephen S Dunn
add new parties or Amend the pleadings; aty
Aaron Thompson

10/27/2010

CAMILLE

notice of hearing; set for Defs Motion on
11-15-2010 @2pm: aty Aaron Thompson

10/29/2010

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment: aty Stephen S Dunn
Aaron Thompson

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Lesa Darlene Horrocks in support of Stephen S Dunn
Defs Motion for Summary Judgment; aty Aaron
Thompson

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Alan Smith in support of Defs Motion
for Summary Judgment; aty Aaron Thompson

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Brent L Grigg in Support of Defs
Motion for Summary Judgment; aty Aaron
Thompson

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of Defs Motion for
Summary Judgment: aty Aaron Thompson

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

11/2/2010

HRSC

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/15/201002:00
PM)

Stephen S Dunn

11/19/2010

ORDR

KARLA

Order to extned deadling to add new parties to
11/30/10 /s J Dunn 11/19/10

Stephen S Dunn

11/22/2010

DCHH

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion held on 11/15/2010
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sheila Fish
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing of Defendants Motion for
summary Judgment: aty Aaron Thompson

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/31/2011 03:00
PM)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Memorandum in opposition to motion for Stephen S Dunn
summary judgment; aty Gary Cooper for plntf

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Delwyn Mickelsen; aty Gary Cooper
for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

1/18/2011

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Justin Hokanson; aty Gary Cooper

Stephen S Dunn

1/24/2011

CAMILLE

Defendants Reply Brief to Plntfs Memorandum
Stephen S Dunn
and Opposition to motion for summary judgment;
aty Aaron Thompson

HRVC

KARLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 10/17/2011
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Stephen S Dunn

HRVC

KARLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/12/2011
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Stephen S Dunn

12/2/2010
12/6/2010

HRSC

1/14/2011

2/2/2011

s
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Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc.
Date

Code

User

2/2/2011

DCHH

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/31/2011
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Sheila Fish
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less 100

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Memorandum Decision and order on motion for
summary judgment;

Stephen S Dunn

JDMT

CAMILLE

Judgment;
Judgment be entered in this mater
in favor af said defs and against the plntf
Mickelsen cons. Inc and this case is hereby
DISMISSED:
sl Judge Dunn 2-2-2011

Stephen S Dunn

CSTS

CAMILLE

Case Status Changed: Closed

Stephen S Dunn

2/1612011

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Aaron Thompson RE: Fees and Costs; Stephen S Dunn

3/712011

DCANO

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Stephen S Dunn
Supreme Court Paid by: Cooper & Larsen,
Chartered Receipt number: 0008015 Dated:
3/7/2011 Amount: $101.00 (Check) For:
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. (plaintiff)

CAMILLE

Objection to defendants Memorandum for
attorneys fees and costs; aty Gary Cooper for
plntf

Stephen S Dunn

APSC

DCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Stephen S Dunn

NOTC

DCANO

NOTICE OF APPEAL; Gary L. Cooper; Attorney
for Plntfs.

Stephen S Dunn

MISC

DCANO

Check # 27338 for $101.00 received on 3-7-11
and Check # 27339 for $100.00 (deposit for
Clerk's Record) on 3-7-11.

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for 4-11-2011 @ 2pm: aty Stephen S Dunn
Aaron Thompson

HRSC

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
04/11/2011 02:00 PM) Fees and Costs

Stephen S Dunn

CSTS

CAMILLE

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Stephen S Dunn

3/17/2011

MISC

DCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL; Signed
and Mailed to Counsel and Supreme Court on
3-17-11.

Stephen S Dunn

3/23/2011

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Notice of Appeal
Stephen S Dunn
received in SC on 3-21-11. Docket Number
38634-2011. Clerk's Record and Reporter's
Transcripts must be filed in SC on 5-25-11
(4-20-11 5 weeks prior) The following Transcripts
shall be Lodged: Motin for Summary Judgment
held 1-31-11.

3/24/2011

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Certificate
received in SC on 3-21-11. Please examine the
titlte and contact Dist Court Clerk of any
corrections. If not any the Title in the Certificate
must appear on all Documents filed with SC.

3/8/2011
3/9/2011

Judge

Stephen S Dunn
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Case: CV-2010-0002757-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, etal.

Mickelsen Construction, Inc.

VS.

Lesa Darlene Horrocks, Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc.
Judge

Date

Code

User

3/24/2011

MISC

DCANO

CORRECTED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
Stephen S Dunn
APPEAL; Signed and Mailed to Counsel and SC.
Correction: Mickelsen Construction, Inc. in
heading.

3/31/2011

STIP

DCANO

Stipulation to Continue hearing schedule for
Stephen S Dunn
4-11-11. Reasoning for said Stipulation is that Mr.
Thompson has another hearing in Bear Lake
County.

MISC

DCANO

Amended Notice of Hearing; Aaron N. Thompson, Stephen S Dunn
Attorney for Defendants.

4/412011

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Certificate of Stephen S Dunn
Appeal received in SC on 3-28-11. Please
carefully examine the Title if any corrections notify
Dist. Clerk. The Title in the Cert. must appear on
all documents filed in SC.

4/14/2011

HRSC

DCANO

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
05/0212011 02:00 PM) Hearing for Defendant
Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial's
Memorandum of Fees and Costs

Stephen S Dunn

HRWV

DCANO

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
04/11/2011 02:00 PM: Hearing Waived Fees
and Costs

Stephen S Dunn

MISC

DCANO

NOTICE OF LODGING from Sheial T. Fish on
4-25-11.

Stephen S Dunn

MISC

DCANO

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT RECEIVED IN
COURT RECORDS FROM Sheila Fish on
4-25-11 for Summary Judgment Motion held
1-31-11.

Stephen S Dunn

DCHH

KARLA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Stephen S Dunn
05/02/2011 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel(
Court Reporter: Sheila Fish
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less 100
Hearing for Defendant Horrocks and Sunshine
Secretarial's Memorandum of Fees and Costs

CAMILLE

Judgment for attorneys fees; Defs shall have a Stephen S Dunn
judgment ag Plaintf in the amount of $2,802.50 as
of 5-2-2011: sl Judge Dunn 5-9-2011

4/25/2011

5/912011

5/11/2011

Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar #1814
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182

: _ _ _ __
'~'l

~J

OEP

Counsel/or Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
)
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES )
INC.,
)
)
Defendants
)
)

CASE NO.

CAf-IO-'(1757-DC

COMPLAINT

Pr

4co~ ~.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for a cause of action against the Defendants, states and
alleges as follows:

I.
Plaintiff Mickelsen Construction, Inc. is an Idaho corporation organized under the laws of
the State of Idaho.

II.
Defendant Lesa Darlene Horrocks is an individual residing in Pocatello, Bannock County,
Idaho.

s
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II.
Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. is an Idaho corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Idaho.
IV.
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. threatened to file a material lien against a project in which
Accelerated Paving, Inc. was involved.

V.
Alan Smith of Accelerated Paving, Inc. came to Delwyn Mickelsen and requested that
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. not file the lien because that would prevent Accelerated Paving, Inc.
from getting paid on the project. Alan Smith offered to pay by credit card but explained that he
would have to use the project payment to pay the balance on his credit card before he could obtain
the credit necessary to fund the credit card payment.
VI.
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. agreed not to file the lien on the condition that Alan Smith and
Accelerated Paving, Inc. obtain someone to guarantee the payment by credit card which was offered
by Alan Smith and Accelerated Paving, Inc ..
VII.
Defendant Lesa D. Horrocks agreed to guarantee the credit card payment of Alan Smith and
Accelerated Paying, Inc. and to do so wrote a check on the account of Sunshine Secretarial Services,
Inc. and Lesa D. Horrocks in the amount of $34,980.00 on January 8,2009. A copy of said check
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

COMPLAINT - PAGE 2
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VIII.

The check written by Lisa D. Horrocks on the account of Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc.
and Lesa D. Horrocks bounced and despite numerous demands the checking account on which the
check was written never had sufficient funds for the check. Copies of letters from Idaho Central
Credit Union dated January 26,2009 and January 27,2009 are attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
IX.

That the sum owed is a liquidated sum and plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from and after January 8,2009, and until a Judgment is entered in this matter.

x.
This is a matter which pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120, the Plaintiffis entitled to reasonable
attorney fees for pursing this action. In the event of default a reasonable attorney fee is $2,500.00
together with Court costs incurred.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendants as follows:
1.

For the sum of $34,980.00 against Lesa D. Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial

Services, Inc., jointly and severally.
2.

For interest at the rate of 12% per annum from and after January 8, 2009, and until

a Judgment is entered in this matter.
3.

For a reasonable attorney's fee in the amount of$2,500.00 in the event of default and

if the matter is contested attorney fees be awarded based on a hourly rate of $200.00 per hour;
4.

For Court costs incurred herein.

5.

For such other and further relief as to the Court deems just and equitable in the

premIses.

COMPLAINT - PAGE 3
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') (,+i'DATED this c/-

day of June, 2010.
COOPER & LARSEN

COMPLAINT - PAGE 4
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January 26, 2009

Mickelsen Construction
PO BOX 429
Blackfoot ID 83221
RE: Insufficient Funds

To Whom It May Concern:
I am wliting in regards to check # 9061 drawn on account 66286991 under the name of
Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. The check mentioned above has non-sufficient funds
as of January 26, 2009.
Should you have any questions in regards to this matter please feel free to contact me at
208-478-3300.

bcarlson(a{icCll. com

B
6

January 27, 2009

Mickelsen Construction
PO BOX 429
Blackfoot ID 8322 I
RE: Insufficient Funds

To Whom It May Concern:
I am wliting in regards to check # 9061 drawn on account 66286991 under the name of
Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. The check mentioned above has non-sufficient funds
as of January 27,2009.
- Should you have any questions in regards to this matter please feel free to contact me at
208-478-3300.

Brittany Carlson
Assistant Manager
Blackfoot Store
bcarl son(a}iccu. com

7

DAVID H. MAGUIRE, ISB#2109
DAVID K. PENROD, ISB#6481
MAGUIRE & PENROD
1414 E. Center - P.O. Box 4758
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4758
Telephone: (208) 232-5167
FAX: (208) 232-5181
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2010-2757-0C

ANSWER

COME NOW the Defendants, Lesa Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by
and through the law firm of Maguire & Penrod, and as their Answer to the Complaint filed by
Plaintiff respond as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

The Plaintiff s complaint fails to state a claimupon which relief may be granted
and should be dismissed.
SECOND DEFENSE

2.

The Defendants deny each and every allegation of the complaint that is not

8

specifically and expressly admitted in this answer. The allegations are denied
based upon Defendants' belief that they are incorrect, false, misconstrue facts or
upon a lack of sufficient information on the part of Defendants to admit or deny
the same.
3.

Responding to paragraph I of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants lack
sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained
therein and, hereby, deny the same.

4.

The Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs II and III of the
Plaintiffs Complaint.

5.

Responding to paragraph IV of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants lack
sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained
therein and, hereby, deny the same.

6.

Responding to paragraph V of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants lack
sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations concerning
conversations taking place between Alan Smith of Accelerated Paving, Inc. and
Delwyn Mickelsen contained therein and, hereby, deny the same. Defendants
admit that Accelerated Paving, Inc. offered to pay a debt to Mickelsen
Construction by way of credit card transaction once Accelerated Paving, Inc.
obtained the funds necessary to make the credit card payment.

7.

Responding to paragraph VI of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants lack
sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained
therein and, hereby, deny the same.

8.

Responding to paragraph VII of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants admit

9

that a check was drafted in the amount of$34,980.00 on January 8,2009, and that
a correct copy of said check is attached to the Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit A,
but Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph VII of the
Plaintiff s Complaint. Further the Defendants affirmatively assert that at no time
did they enter into any verbal or written contract to guarantee a payment from
Alan Smith and/or Accelerated Paving, Inc. to Plaintiff.
9.

Responding to paragraph VIII ofthe Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants deny
the allegations contained in paragraph VIII of the Plaintiffs Complaint and
affirmatively assert that the check referenced in paragraph VII of the Plaintiffs
Complaint was drafted and conditionally given to the Plaintiff on January 8,2009,
to be held until confirmation was given by Defendants to Plaintiff that funds were
available.

10.

The Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs IX and X of the
Plaintiffs Complaint.

11.

Responding to the prayer for relief contained in the Plaintiffs Complaint, the
Defendant denies that the Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

12.

By raising the following defenses, the Defendants make no admission of any kind
and do not assume any burden of proof or production not otherwise properly
resting upon them in this lawsuit. Rather, the Defendants merely identify defenses
to preserve them for all proper uses under applicable law. The Defendants have
yet to complete discovery in this case, the result of which may reveal additional
defenses to the Plaintiff s Complaint. As such, the Defendants reserve the right to
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supplement, modify or delete defenses-after discovery is completed.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
13.

The Plaintiff s claims are barred by the statute of frauds that precludes actions to
enforce a verbal contract on a promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another. The Defendants did not enter into a verbal or written
contract to answer for the debts of Accelerated Paving, Inc.; but, even if the
Defendants did enter into an agreement as alleged, no written contract exists as
required by the statute of frauds.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

14.

The Plaintiffs claims are barred for lack of consideration. The Defendants did
not receive any thing of value in exchange for the alleged promise to answer for
the debt of Accelerated Paving, Inc.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

15.

The Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, laches and waiver.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

16.

The Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

17.

The Defendants claim a lack of privity as Defendants have never entered into any
contractual or debtor/creditor arrangements with the Plaintiff.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

18.

The Plaintiffs damages, if any, were caused by acts both superseding and
intervening, or acts or omissions of parties and entities other than the Defendants
over whom the Defendants have no controland-no right to control.
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ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
19.

The Defendants have been required to retain the services of the law firm of
Maguire and Penrod to defend this action, and have incurred and will incur costs
and attorney fees in connection therewith. The Defendants are entitled to recover
their attorney fees and other costs of defense from the Plaintiff pursuant to Idaho
Code Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123.

WHEREFORE, the Defendants pray that any relief requested by Plaintiffbe denied, and
that the Defendants be granted relief as follows:
1.

Dismiss the complaint with prejUdice, and find that the Plaintiff takes nothing
thereby;

2.

That the Court issue an award for all costs and attorneys fees incurred by the
Defendants in connection with this matter; and,

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.
JURY DEMAND

The Defendants demand a jury trial for all claims and causes of action stated by this
answer pursuant to Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED t U a y of July, 2010.

~
DAVID H. MAGUIRE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was:
g"mailed, postage prepaid
D hand delivered
o Telefax
to the following, this ZZ--day of July, 2010, and addressed as follows:
Gary L. Cooper
COOPER & LARSEN
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

Maguire
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MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
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Plaintiff,
-vsLESA DARLENE HORROCKS and SUNSHINE
SECRETARIAL SERVICES, INC.,
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)
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ORDER FOR SUBMISSION
OF INFORMATION FOR
SCHEDULING ORDER

)

Defendants.

A Complaint was filed in this matter on the 30th day of June, 2010. The Defendant[s] have
now appeared and/or answered and the case is at issue.
Pursuant to 1.R.c.P. 16, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within fourteen (14) days of the
date of this Order:
A) The parties, through their counsel (or the parties themselves if self-represented), shall CONFER
and reach agreement on each of the issues listed below.
B) After the parties have conferred and reached an agreement on each issue, PLAINTIFF'S
counsel (or Plaintiff, if self-represented) shall submit to the Court the AGREED RESPONSE to
each issue listed below.
C) Issues on which the parties must reach an agreement and submit a response:
(1) Whether this matter is to be tried to the Court or to a jury.

(2) Whether service is still needed upon any unserved parties.
(3) Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are expected.
(4) Whether an unusual amount oftime is needed for trial preparation and/or discovery.

Case No. CV-2010-02757-0C
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMAnON FOR SCHEDULING ORDER
Page 1

14

(5) The number of trial days required for trial.
(6) Whether there are any other matters the parties agree would be helpful to a determination of
the case that should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a Scheduling
Order, and what those matters are.

(7) TWO (2) TRIAL DATES, that comply with the requirements listed below. The trial
date for the case will be the earliest date submitted by agreement of the parties. The reason the
Court asks for two trial dates is so that optional backup trial date is available and calendared in
the event the first trial date has to be continued by Motion to and Order of the Court. In the
event an Order continuing the trial setting becomes necessary, the additional trial date avoid the
need to vacate the trial setting for up to a year. Thus, the parties should plan to try the case on
the first date submitted. However, do not submit less
•

th~tn

two trial dates.

The two dates must be AGREED to by the parties and must be the specific day upon
which the trial will begin.

•

Each date submitted must be a TUESDA Y. [If the Monday of that week is a holiday, the
date submitted must be a WEDNESDAY].

•

Do not submit trial dates for the third week of any month as that is the Court's criminal
trial week.

•

The first agreed trial date must be a specific day no less than nine (9) months and no more
than twelve (12) months from the date of this Order.

•

The second agreed trial date must be a specific day no less than twelve (12) months and no

more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this Order.
•

If the parties agree that unusual factors may justify a trial setting schedule which varies in
any way from the requirements of this Order, the parties may submit those factors in the

Case No. CV-2010-02757-0C
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER
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AGREED RESPONSE and the Court will give serious consideration to those factors in
setting the trial date. But the parties must still submit two agreed trial dates that comply
with this Order.
D) Upon receipt of the AGREED RESPONSE the Court will issue a scheduling Order setting the
matter for trial on the agreed dates with deadlines for discovery, disclosure of witnesses, etc.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties do not file the AGREED RESPONSE
Ordered herein, within the fourteen (14) days of the date of this ORDER, the Court will set this
matter for trial on dates available to the Court and will not approve stipulations to modify the trial
dates set.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATEDthis

b~ayof

k#

,2010.

s~-District Judge

Case No. CV-2010-027S7-0C
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
\l') day of--"'.............~~'-=-_---' 2010, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon eac f the following individuals
in the manner indicated.
Gary L. Cooper
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
David H. Maguire
David K. Penrod
Maguire & Penrod
PO Box 4758
Pocatello,ID 83205-4758

DATED this

\l2J

(~U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile
(.,(U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

day of _~!o.A.A..~~:::::--_ _ ' 2010.

Case No. CV-2010-02757-0C
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,JG-19-2010

16: 50

Omy L. Cooper. Idaho Stale Bar # J8) 4
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 Nonb 'Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, 1D 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
(208) 235-1182
Facsimile:

ZDIa MIG 23 PH 2= 30

~unc

Counsellnr Plairtlilf

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAl DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

)
)

Plaintift~

CASE NO. CV-2010-027S7-0C

)
)

vs.

)
)

LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
)
SUNSBlNE SECRETARIAL SERVICES )

RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR
SUBMISSION OF lNFORMAttON FOR

SCHEDULING ORDER

)

mc~

)

Defendants

)
)

COME NOW the parties and pursuant to the Counts Order fol" submission of information
for scheduling order State as follows:
(1) Whether any service is still needed upon any unserved parties.
RE~PONSE:

No.

(2) Whether motions to add new panies or otherwise amend the pleadings are contemplated.
RESPONSE: No.

(3) Whether the parties currently contemplate or anticipate any pre-tri'al motions.

RESPONSE: Yes.
(4) Whether the Gase presents any unU$uallime requirements for trial preparation.
RESPONSE: No.

ORIGINALP

RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR SUBMlSSION OF INF(18MATION FOR SCHEDULJNG ORDER - p,,(;~; I

.. 1UG-19-2010

16:513

(5) The agreed amount of time required for trial.
RESlONSE: 3-4 days.

(6) Whether the case presents any unusual time requirements for discovery.
RESPONSE: No.
(7) Whethel' any party requests coun-order mediation.

RESPONSE! No.
(8) Three stipulated trial dates, Ont no Jess than she (6) months and no more than nine (9)
months from the date of this Order, and a second no less than nine (9) months and no more than

twelve (12) months from the date oftrus Order, and a third no less than twelve (I2) months and no
more than fifteen (lS) months from the date of this Order. Dates during the third week of each
month shall be reserved for criminal jmy trial and should not be submitted as possible trial dates.
RESPONSE: This case cannot be ready for trial within 9 months frOlll the date of the Order;

July 12-15 2011; and August 2·5,2011.
(9) Whether there are other mattets conducive to detennination of the action that the panies

agree should be brought to the attention of the Coun prior to entering a Scheduling Order.

RESlONSE: No.
DATED this ~ day of August, 2010.

COOPER & LARSEN

MAGUIRE & PENROD

RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR SUBMISSION O'F INFORMAT10N FOR SCllEDVLlNG ORDER. PAct 2
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or~

Aaron N. Thompson, Esq.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON,
216 West Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 6235

C~TERED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
INC.,

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 56

~

Defendant.

Defendants Lesa Daralene Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by and
through their counsel of record, Aaron N. Thompson of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson,
Chartered, hereby move this Court for an order granting Summary Judgment as to all claims
alleged in Plaintiff Mickelsen Construction Inc.'s Complaint filed on or about June 30, 2010.
This Motion will be supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of Lesa Darlene Horrocks, Brent L. Grigg, and Allen
Smith.
WHEREFORE it is respectfully prayed:
1. That this Court set oral argument and briefing schedule consistent with Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 56;
2. That after said hearing, the Court enter summary judgment in favor of Defendants;
3. That Court award Defendants their attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code

CASE NO: CV-201O-27S7-0C - DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT PURSUANT TO
LRC.P. RULE 56- PAGE 1
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and applicable Idaho rules;
4. Any and ~!U~~~lief as just and equitable.
DATED thisCL1dJy of October, 2010
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment Pursuant to I.R. c.P. Rule 56 was served on the following named persons at the
addresses shown and in the manner indicated.

Gary L. Cooper
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[~S.Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

+l

DATED

thi~1 day of October, 2010

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C - DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
LR.C.P. RULE 56- PAGE 2

21

--'

<C

2tJIUf1

~

Aaron N. Thompson, Esq.
Rv
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTEREd'
216 West Whitman
P • 0 • Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 6235
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
INC.,

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C
AFFIDAVIT OF LESA DARLENE
HORROCKS IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Bannock )
Lesa Darlene does depose and state:
1. I am one ofthe Defendants in the above captioned action.
2. I am the partial owner of closely held corporation, Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc.
3. My corporation's physical address is 845 W. Center Street, Suite C, Pocatello, Idaho.
4. Sunshine is in the business of providing contract secretarial services, professional
office space rental with in-house services, as well as, accounting and management
servIces.

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C -AFFIDAVIT OF LESA HORROCKS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 56- PAGE 1
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5. In the course of transacting Sunshine's business, Sunshine maintains and pays for a
credit card machine in order to accept payment from clients to her various tenants for
their services rendered.
6. Sunshine pays a monthly fee, and in exchange for that monthly fee, is capable of
transacting with American Express credit cards, as well as Discover, Visa and
MasterCard.
7. Accelerated Paving, Inc. subleases a common office space in the Sunshine offices in
Pocatello, Idaho, by paying monthly rent.

__~"

8. Sunshine also provides secretarial services, at times, for Accelerated Paving, Inc., and
other in-house services such as copies, DSL, cleaning, etc.
9. Sunshine's contacts with Accelerated Paving are Brent Grigg (the general manager of
Accelerated) and Alan Smith (Accelerated's Vice President).
10. On or about January 8, 2009, I was approached by Brent and Alan with Accelerated
Paving and asked if they could use Sunshine's credit card machine to run a $34,980
transaction, and correspondingly write a check to Mickelsen Construction for the
same amount, with the understanding that American Express would pay the debt in
the normal course of business.
11. It is my understanding that Accelerated Paving, Inc. contacted American Express
prior to this transaction, explained to AmEx the transaction that Accelerated was
requesting, and it was my understanding that Accelerated gained approval.
12. Relying on these representations, Accelerated Paving, Inc., gave Sunshine their
American Express credit card, and on January 8, 2009, I ran the credit card through
Sunshine's credit card machine.
13. Based upon my experience with the machine, and the fact that I run this through my
normal course of business, I believed that the credit card transaction was approved by
American Express and the money would be sent through.
14. After witnessing said approval Sunshine I executed a check on January 8, 2009
(check No. 9061), to the order of Mickelsen Construction in the amount of $34,980
for him to hold until the funds came to my bank.
15. There were no other writings, memorandums, or documents regarding this
transaction.
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-OC -AFFIDAVIT OF LESA HORROCKS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 56- PAGE 2
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16. The sole purpose of Sunshine writing this check, and runmng the credit card
transaction, was to facilitate a transaction between Accelerated Paving, Inc. and
Mickelsen Construction.
17. I received absolutely no financial benefit from this transaction, at the time this was
processed, or at any time thereafter.
18. I never told anyone in writing, or verbally, that Sunshine was willing to accept this
debt on Accelerated's behalf at the time that transaction had occurred, or at any time
afterwards.
19. Several days later, I was informed by Accelerated Paving, Inc. that American Express
was not going to approve the transaction.
20. Immediately corresponding with this conversation with Accelerated Paving,
Mickelsen Construction was contacted, and informed of what had occurred, and not
to cash the check.
21. Mr. Mickelsen admitted to me that check had not yet been cashed.
22. It is my understanding that Accelerated Paving, Inc. filed bankruptcy.
23. I was sued by Mickelsen Construction, in this case, shortly thereafter.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED thi~ay of October, 2010

i

- - - - - - - - - ' - - -____.~

/

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, Notary, this

d11D day of October, 2010

CFORIDAHO

Residi~g ~t:\fffl~b~
CommlsslOn'itx'Plres: 0\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Lesa Darlene Horrocks
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following named persons at the
addresses shown and in the manner indicated.

[YJJ U.S. Mail

Gary L. Cooper
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

l j Facsimile

[ ] Hand Delivery

~
DATED thiS'l! day of October, 2010

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C -AFFIDAVIT OF LESA HORROCKS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 56- PAGE 4
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Aaron N. Thompson, Esq.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 West Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 6235
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
INC.,

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C
AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN SMITH IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Bannock )
Alan Smith does depose and state:
1. I am Alan Smith, and I am the vice president of Accelerated Paving, Inc.
2. Accelerated Paving, Inc. (hereinafter "Accelerated") is a corporation authorized to do
business in the State of Idaho.
3. Accelerated is physically located at 45 West Center, Suite C-IO, Pocatello, Idaho
83204.
4. Prior to January 9, 2009, Accelerated had a contractual relationship with Mickelsen
Construction in which Mickelsen provided services at an Accelerated job site.

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C -AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN SMITH IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 56-PAGE 1
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5. Accelerated owed Mickelsen $34, 980.00 for services rendered associated with the
debt referenced in Paragraph 4 ofthis Affidavit.
6. During the first week of January, 2009,

Acc~lerated's

General Manager Brent Grigg,

and myself, conversed as to how to pay the above referenced debt because Mickelsen
was understandably becoming impatient about receiving the due funds.
7. Mickelsen threatened to file a materialmen's lien against the real property to secure
his funds.
8. Accelerated knew that if Mickelsen filed the lien, we would be delayed in receiving
payment from our job. We wanted to avoid the lien at all costs.
9. We contacted American Express to see if we could facilitate a charge to our
American Express Business Credit Card account to pay Mickelsen an amount of
$34,980.00.
10. We received confirmation that we had the available credit, and that we could pay
Mickelsen with this card.
11. We immediately started making arrangements to run this American Express
transaction to pay Mickelsen, particularly to avoid Mickelsen from filing a lien (as he
had a right to do).
12. On January 8, 2009, Delwynn Mickelsen of Mickelsen Construction came to
Accelerated Paving'S office and inquired as to the payment due.
13. We told Mr. Mickelsen that we would be able to pay him on January 9, 2010, based
on our conversation with American Express and that we had sufficient credit with
American Express to pay off this outstanding debt.
14. Mr. Mickelsen indicated that he could not accept an American Express payment as
his business did not accept that particular credit card.
15. I also asked him to see ifhis bank would accept the transaction by running our card,
they declined.
16. At that point, we spoke with Lesa Horrocks of Sunshine Secretarial Services, our
landlord, and spoke with her about her business, Sunshine, facilitating an American
Express credit card transaction.
17. We told Sunshine that we had pre-approval from American Express, that we had
sufficient credit to pay this debt, and that all she had to do was swipe the card.
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C -AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN SMITH IN S~RT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 56-PAGE 2
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18. Sunshine ran the credit card through, based on our representations.
19. Mr. Mickelsen agreed and had full knowledge of this transaction, but he did ask for
Sunshine to write a check that he would hold until monies were received.
20. On reliance from American Express, and our representations Sunshine wrote a check
in the amount of$34,980.00.
21. In mid-January, 2009, I received a letter dated January 14, 2009, from American
Express.
22. This letter carne directly from American Express, and this was regarding
Accelerated's business platinum card.
23. This is the typical way I receive correspondence from American Express regarding
Accelerated's American Express Business Credit Card.
24. Accelerated keeps these types of letters in the course and conduct of its regularly
conducted business activity, i.e. conducting business charges and know the financial
status of the credit account.
25. I have attached a copy of this January 14, 2009 letter and the letter is incorporated
herein as Exhibit "A".
26. I immediately contacted Mickelsen and told him that the transaction, wrongfully, did
not go through.
27. I asked him not to cash Sunshine's check, because Sunshine would not likely have
sufficient funds to support the check, due to American Express's failure.
28. I strongly disagreed with American Express's position on closing our account,
partiCUlarly given we had prior approval to run this transaction before we did it.
29. Had I known, prior to January 9, 2009, that American Express would not have
honored our credit with them (the transaction); we would have never attempted
running the credit card transaction, or involving Sunshine Secretarial.
30. On Wednesday, January 14, 2009, I approximately 2:30 p.m., I sent an e-mail to
Michelle Malone at American Express.
31. I have attached a true and correct copy of this e-mail to this Affidavit as Exhibit "B".
32. This e-mail lines out, contemporaneous with the problem, that we had American
Express.

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C -AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN SMITH IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
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33. There were no other writings; written agreements, or memoralization regarding this
transaction BETWEEN MICKELSEN AND ACCELERATED.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this61 day of October, 2010

J..>-"~L-_

day of October, 2010

I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Alan Smith Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following named persons at the addresses
shown and in the manner indicated.

t!J U.S. Mail

Gary L. Cooper
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

DATED

thi~

[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

of October, 2010

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C-AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN SMITH IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
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Brent G
from;
Sent:

'-A",'"u .. ves,Ul[E!SC(m~Ol.com

WIl,rln~l!!tltj~1I

January 14, 2009 2:13 PM

To:
Cc:
SLlbJect;
Attachments:

January 14, 2009

American Express
Michelle Malone
Fax number (800) 219-2549
Dear Michelle,
This letter is in regards to our !3,.""lInT number 372720216481005.
Recently you closed our account
an unknown reason. Upon speaking with a representative from American Express
last week, we made a
to a vendor and had approval from Amex on our account for a total of $34,890.00. In
turn, the company collecting this
for that vendor wrote a check for the entire balance of $34,890.00, relying on the
confirmation that we would be a to pay them that amount of money when we paid off our balance with you. (See
ettached copy of check). We
on having these funds available and it has put us in a hardship with our
vendors. The documentation we
in the first fax reflects not a payment but What was going to be charged to our
American Express account since
approval was given on January 8,2009. You may look through our transactions on
the card ana not find any other
for $34,890.00.

We have been a cardholder since

and count on American Express for daily transactions. We have always paid our

bill and have had a great r",I~ltit'\I"\liO!hl ... with you. Closing our account will, and has put our company in an extreme

hardship. Again. we paid our
declined. I strongly request you
our obligation to our ve~dor and

in full and had an agreement with you for a $34,890.00 transaction and it has been
re-consider reopening our account at the same balance or larger so that we may meet
re businesses?

We are looking forward to a great

this year, we have just been awarded over $800,000.00 in contracts and need all
the help we can get to fund these nrn"GlrfCl one is an Air Force contract in Las Vegas and the other one is for a
Municipality in Utah.

Please contact me on my cell

immediately so we can discuss the options available

Thank you,

Alan Smith
208-221-9020

A Good Credit Score is 700 or HUI.,.ru. See yours in lust 2 easy stepsr

1

30

z

Aaron N. Thompson, Esq.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 West Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 6235
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
INC.,

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT L. GRIGG IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Bannock )
Brent L. Grigg does depose and state:
1. My name is Brent L. Grigg, and I am the general manager of Accelerated Paving, Inc.
2. Accelerated Paving, Inc. (hereinafter "Accelerated") is, and at all times relevant to
this lawsuit, a corporation authorized to do business in the State of Idaho.
3. Accelerated is located at 845 W. Center, Suite C-10, Pocatello, Idaho 83204.
4. At a time prior to January 1, 2009, Mickelsen Construction entered into a contractual
agreement with Accelerated to provide asphalt for an Accelerated worksite.
5. Accelerated agreed to pay Mickelsen $34,980.00 for services rendered.
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6. In order to pay this outstanding debt, Accelerated contacted Delwynn Mickelsen, of
Mickelsen Construction, who is believed by Accelerated to be an agent of Mickelsen
Construction.
7. Accelerated asked Mickelsen if it could pay the outstanding debt (referenced

111

Paragraph 5 of this Affidavit) with an American Express credit card.
8. Mr. Mickelsen agreed to accept this payment, but indicated that Mickelsen
Construction did not have the business means of accepting an American Express
credit card.
9. I, on behalf of Accelerated, contacted Lesa Horrocks with Sunshine Secretarial, Inc.
to see ifher business could facilitate an American Express credit card transaction.
10. I knew from my previous professional experiences with Sunshine that Sunshine
accepted American Express cards.
11. I contacted Sunshine and asked if Sunshine would be willing to facilitate a payment
to Mickelsen Construction, from Accelerated, by use of Accelerated's American
Express business credit card.
12. Our plan was that Sunshine would run the Accelerated American Express card, gain
approval for said transaction , and Sunshine would write Mickelsen a check for the
total amount when the money came in, however, Mickelsen wanted a post-dated
check that day.
13. It was understood that Sunshine would be reimbursed the total amount of the
transaction from American Express when the transaction cleared.
14. Mickelsen was present for many discussions regarding this potential transaction,
including the day that the card was ran, and wasin-agreement with it.
15. In anticipation of this, Accelerated contacted American Express before running this
transaction through Sunshine's credit card machine, and gained confirmation from
an American Express agent that American Express would honor this facilitated
transaction.
16. After gaining pre-approval from American Express, I physically gave the Accelerated
American Express Business card for Sunshine to swipe through its credit card
machine.
~i .. ·
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17. I personally observed Lesa Horrocks, on behalf of Sunshine, draft a check to
Delwynn Mickelsen to cover the transaction when the money came in.
18. Mr. Mickelsen understood the transaction as he was present for all of the discussions,
including that day.
19. Sunshine was not going to receive any financial benefit for running this transaction,
nor did it in any fashion.
20. There was absolutely no agreement between Accelerated Paving and Sunshine, or
Lesa Horrocks, for Sunshine/Horrocks to assume Accelerated Paving's debt to Mr.
Mickelsen in any fashion.
21. Mickelsen required that Sunshine give him a check in the amount of $34,980.00 to
cash, once the funds from American Express were received.
22. Mickelsen understood that he was not supposed to cash the check until he received
confirmation that the transaction was consummated and Sunshine had received the
funds.
23. Mickelsen did not cash the check, nor did he attempt to, for several weeks after
January 9,2009.
24. On or about January 14, 2009, we received a letter from American Express indicating
that our American Express card had been cancelled.
25. Immediately, I contacted Mr. Mickelsen to inform him not to cash the check, as I
realized the agreement would not be honored by American Express.
26. He admitted to me that he had not yet cashed the check, which was consistent with
the agreement we had made on January 9,2009.
27. Due to other unforeseen circumstances, Accelerated Paving was forced to file
bankruptcy on March 6,2009.
28. Mickelsen Construction was included as a creditor in the bankruptcy filing, and this
is the exact same debt ($34,980.00) that is involved in this case.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
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DATED this )1 day of October, 2010

~

SUBSCRIDED AND SWORN to before me, Notary this
\\'

,

1-day of October, 2010
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Brent L. Grigg Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following named persons at the addresses
shown and in the manner indicated.

Gary L. Cooper
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

DATED

thi~OfOctober,

H11.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

2010
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Aaron N. Thompson, Esq.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 West Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 6235
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C

vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
I.R.C.P. RULE 56

LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
INC.,
Defendant.

Defendants Lesa Darlene Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by and
through their counsel of record, Aaron N. Thompson of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson,
Chartered, respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The Statement of Facts that follow derive from the Affidavits filed

contemporaneousl y herewith and the pleadings filed by both Parties.

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. (hereinafter "Sunshine") is a closely held
corporation, owned primarily by Lesa Darlene Horrocks (hereinafter "Lesa").

Sunshine is

located at 845 W Center St # C, Pocatello, Idaho, and Lesa;s-its sole employee. Sunshine is in
the business of providing contract secretarial services, professional office space rental with inhouse services, as well as accounting and management services, in Pocatello, Idaho.
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Accelerated Paving, Inc, (hereinafter "Accelerated") is a corporation that provides paving
services in Pocatello, Idaho, and Southeast Idaho. Accelerated subleases a common office space
with Sunshine. Sunshine also provided secretarial services, at times, for Accelerated and other
in-house services such as copies, DSL, cleaning, etc.
Some time prior to January 8, 2009, Mickelsen- Construction, Inc (hereinafter
"Mickelsen") subcontracted with Accelerated. The negotiated cost of the services due to
Mickelsen was $34,980.

Mickelsen threatened to file a materialmen's lien against the real

property of Accelerated's project. To avoid this lien, Accelerated and Mickelsen entered an
agreement that Accelerated would immediately pay Mickelsen the outstanding debt with an
American Express credit card.
Mickelsen could not accept American Express credit cards through its business. As a
result, Accelerated approached Sunshine, of which has a credit card transaction machine, and
asked if Sunshine could facilitate the transaction. As a benefit to one of her tenants, Sunshine
agreed to facilitate the transaction. Mickelsen accepted this arrangement and agreed not to file a
materialmen's lien against the real property.
Mickelsen insisted that Sunshine draft a check in the amount of $34,980. It was agreed
that after American Express rendered payment, Mickelsen would be notified and he could then
cash the check. Accelerated would immediately run the American Express credit card for the
total amount.
Accelerated contacted American Express to make certain that this transaction would be
approved. Accelerated received verbal confirmation directly from American Express. Sunshine,
relying to its detriment, on American Express and Accelerated, wrote the check to Mickelsen.
There is no writing signed by any of the Parties memorializing that Sunshine personally
guaranteed the debt, or assumed the debt. It was understood by all Parties that Sunshine was
simply facilitating the transaction because Mickelsen did not accept American Express.
Sunshine did not stand to gain, financially, in any fashion from this transaction.
Mter the check was written, and presented to Mickelsen about a week later, American
Express contacted Accelerated by letter and indicated that it would no longer honor the
transaction.

Therefore, the funds would not be paid to Sunshine from American Express.

Mickelsen was contacted by Accelerated to inform that the check should not be cashed and for
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discussion about other alternatives to paying this debt. Accelerated filed for bankruptcy on or
about March 6,2009, for reasons other than this transaction.

II.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\1ENT

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden of
establishing absence of a genuine issue of material facts rest at all times with the party moving
for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960,963 (1994). When
an action will be tried before the Court without a jury, resolution of the possible conflict between
inferences is within the responsibilities of the trial court as fact finder. Cameron v. Neal, 130
Idaho 898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997).

The trial judge is not constrained to draw

inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for suriiniaryjudgment, but rather the judge is
free to arrive at the most probable inference to be drawn from on contraverted evidentiary facts,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Intermountain Forest Management, 136 Idaho
233,235,31 P.3d 1921, 1923 (2001). (see also Lumos v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807
P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991)). Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party
and all reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in the favor of the
non-moving party. Lockheed Martin Corp v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 134 P.3d 641, 644,
142 Idaho 790, 793 (2006).

III.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

A writing is required to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Idaho Code § 9-505, which is the Idaho
recitation of the Statute of Frauds, requires certain categories of agreements to be in writing.I.C.
§ 9-505. The statute states, in relevant part:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note of
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing or secondary evidence of its contents: ... 2. A special promise to answer
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in
§ 9-506, Idaho Code...

Idaho Code § 9-505(2).
The exceptions to the writing requirements referenced in l. C. § 9-506 are inapplicable to
this case.
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Here, there is no question that the contract asserted by Mickelsen is covered by Idaho
Code § 9-505(2). There is an absolute requirement for a writing or memorandum for a personal
guarantee contract. Here, there is no written memorandum, agreement, or contract, executed by
the Parties, that proves or shows that Sunshine, or Lesa, agreed to assure Accelerated's debt to
Mickelsen. In order for Mickelsen to enforce this obligation, as to Lesa and Sunshine, there
must be a writing that memorializes the agreement.
This debt is, and continues to be, between Accelerated and Mickelsen. There are no facts
that support the argument that Lesa and/or Sunshine agreed to relieve Accelerated of its
obligation to Mickelsen. Sunshine was nothing more than a facilitator to allow Accelerated to
pay its' obligation to Mickelsen by the use of its' American Express credit card machine.
The check written does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Mickelsen may assert that the

January 8, 2009 check written from Sunshine to Mickelsen in the amount of $34,980 1 satisfies
the Statute of Frauds requirement. However, in a similar case, Hemingway v. Gruner, 106 Idaho
422, 679 P.2d 1140 (1984), the Idaho Supreme Court found that a check alone is insufficient to
constitute a memorialization of an agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
In Hemingway, the parties had an oral contract for the sale of real property coupled with a

$7,500 check representative of earnest money. Id at 423. A warranty deed was executed in
consummation of the sale of real property. Id at 423-424. The transaction then fell through. Id.
This transaction fit within the ambit of Idaho Code § 9-505 requiring a writing. 2 The
district court found the various writings in the case were insufficient to comply with the Statue of
Frauds. Id at 424. The court stated "[f]ailure to comply with the Statute of Frauds renders an

oral agreement unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a suit in equity for
specific performance." (citing Hoffman v. Sv. Co., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221
(1981».

"Hoffman required that both parties to a bilateral contract sign the memorandum

evidencing that agreement, and further that if there is a memorandum signed by both, and
another unsigned memorandum supplying some of the essential terms of the entire agreement in
express reference to the unsigned memorandum must be found in the signed memorandum..."
Id. (citing Hoffman, 102 Idaho at 190).

I

2

Exhibit "A" to Mickelsen's Complaint.
A purchase of real estate is required to be in writing pursuant to the Statute of Frauds.
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The court also went on to find, " ... a $5,000 check standing alone was insufficient
compliance where it did not contain the essential agreements of the oral agreement." Id at 425.
As previously stated, Mickelsen contends that Sunshine and Lesa assumed Accelerated's
debt to Mickelsen. Factually, Sunshine and Lesa do not agree with this contention. However,
assuming arguendo, that this is true, the agreement must be in writing in order for Mickelsen to
enforce it. The check is insufficient to comply with the Statute of Frauds. As a matter of law,
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and this claim must be dismissed.

IV.

CONCLUSION

According to Mickelsen's Complaint, there is one legal claim being asserted against
Sunshine and Lesa.

Mickelsen asserts that there is a-personal guarantee contract between

Mickelsen and SunshinelLesa. Legally, this claim cannot withstand summary judgment muster.
The agreement must be in writing, must comply with the Statute of Frauds, and the check written
by SunshinelLesa is insufficient. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Mickelsen's claim against
SunshinelLesa fails, and must be dismissed.

DATED

th;;ij

day of October, 2010
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
Attorneys for Defendant

CASE NO: CV-201O-27S7-0C - MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 56- PAGE 5

39

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to l.R. c.P. Rule 56 was served on the following named
persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.

Gary L. Cooper
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

DATED

[~S.Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

thi~ay of October, 2010
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Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar # 1814
COOPER & ~ARSEN, CHARTEREDZI~i1 I\~'!
151 North ThIrd Avenue, Second Floor"! ... ,
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182

p;:

1-1:

08

Counsel/or Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
)
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES )
INC.,
)
)
Defendants
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2010-02757-0C

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Accelerated Paving, Inc. was indebted to Mickelson Construction for materials supplied on
a project. When Mickelson Construction threatened to lien the job, Accelerated Paving offered to
pay with a credit card. Mickelson Construction would only accept a credit card if a third party gave
a check to cover what was owed. Lesa Horrocks wrote a check on an account bearing the name Lesa
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial Services believing that American Express had approved the
transaction and would fund the credit card transaction to her account. The check is a sufficient
writing to satisfy the statute of frauds. However, if it is not then this is an original obligation of
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial which does not need to comply with the Statute of Frauds.
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Accelerated Paving owed Mickelson Construction $34,980 for materials it provided to
Accelerated Paving on a project.

2.

Accelerated Paving did not pay as agreed.

3.

Mickelson Construction threatened to lien the project.

4.

Accelerated Paving offered payment by credit card.

5.

Mickelson Construction refused to accept the credit card payment unless a third party
guaranteed payment with a check made payable for the $34,980.

6.

Lesa Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial provided a check for $34,980 and ran the credit card
transaction for Accelerated Paving.

7.

When the credit card transaction was not funded Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial refused to
fund the check and it bounced.
ARGUMENT AND DISCUSSION OF LA W

1.

IF L C. §9-505(2) APPLIES THE CHECK IS SUFFICIENT WRITING
Idaho Code § 9-505 provides as follows with respect to agreements whereby one party

guarantees the debt of another:

§ 9-505. Certain agreements to be in writing. - In the following cases the
agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in
writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of
the agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary evidence ofits contents:
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except in the
cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho Code.
Mickelson Construction, Inc. has alleged in its Complaint that Lesa D. Horrocks agreed to
guarantee the debt of Accelerated Paving in the amount of $34,980. Accelerated Paving owed
Mickelson Construction $34,980 for materials it had supplied to Accelerated Paving on a project and,('~i
r"",ji
-1.~<1.
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Mickelson Construction was about to file a lien on the project. Accelerated Paving through Alan
Smith wanted to pay Mickelson Construction with a credit card but did not have sufficient credit to
immediately consummate the transaction. Accelerated Paving needed to be paid on the project so
it could pay down its credit card balance before running the credit card for payment of the money
owed to Accelerated Paving. Mickelson Construction was willing to allow Accelerated to do this
but wanted a check from a third party to guarantee the credit card payment. Lesa Horrocks of
Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. provided the check in the amount of $34,980 to Mickelson
Construction.
Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, claim the check
is not sufficient evidence ofthe "agreement" "or some note or memorandum thereof' to satisfy the
requirements of §I. C.9-S0S. The check is a sufficient writing. It is signed by Lesa Horrocks; is
made payable to Mickelson Construction; is for $34,980; and identifies that it is "For Accel." which
is sufficient to identify Accelerated Paving. §I. C.9-S0S only requires some "note or memorandum"
of the agreement to be in writing and "subscribed the party to be charged." The check most certainly
qualifies as a "note or memorandum" of the agreement and it was signed or "subscribed"\ by Lesa
Horrocks.
Defendants' reliance on Hoffman v. S V Co., 102 Idaho 187, 188 (Idaho 1981) is misplaced.

Hoffman dealt with the purchase and sale of a 1.64 acre undeveloped lot. The "check standing
alone" did not contain the terms of the agreement to purchase the lot because the only notation

\ Generally, the signature required by the statute of frauds may be any symbol made or
adopted by a party, with an actual or apparent intent to authenticate the writing and give it force
and effect. [citations omitted] The traditional form of signature is, of course, the handwritten
name of the signer. But initials or any symbol may also be used; and the signature may be written
in pencil, typed, printed, made with a rubber stamp or impressed into the paper. George W
Watkins Family v. Messenger, lIS Idaho 386, 389 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988)
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carried on that check is the phrase "Escrow Ruud Mtn. Lots."

This case does not involve the

purchase and sale of real property with numerous component parts. It involves Lesa Horrocks
promise to guarantee the debt of Accelerated Paving to Mickelson Construction. The check is a
sufficient note or memorandum of the transaction and complies with the Statute of Frauds.

2.

BASED ON THE AFFIDAVIT OF LESA HORROCKS THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY
In her Affidavit, Lesa Horrocks states that she relied on Accelerated Paving's representation

that American Express had approved the credit card transaction; she ran Accelerated Paving's credit
card through her machine; she believed the money would come to her account; and she gave
Mickelson Construction a check believing American Express would be paying the money into the
account on which the check was drawn. Her Affidavit confirms that the obligation to pay Mickelson
Construction $34,980 is an original obligation ofHorrocks/Sunshine Secretarial. I. C. §9-505(2)
does not apply to cases covered by I. C. §9-506:
§ 9-506. Original obligations -- Writing not needed. - A promise to answer for the
obligation of another, in any of the following cases, is deemed an original obligation
of the promisor, and need not be in writing:
1. Where the promise is made by one who has received property of another
upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise; or by one who has received
a discharge from an obligation in whole or in part, in consideration of such promise.
2. Where the creditor parts with value, or enters into an obligation, in
consideration of the obligations in respect to which the promise is made, in terms or
under circumstances such as to render the party making the promise the principal
debtor, and the person in whose behalf it is made, his surety.
3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made
upon the consideration that the party receiving it cancels the antecedent obligation,
accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the consideration that the
party receiving it releases the property of another from a levy, or his person from
imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent
obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from
either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another person.
4. Where a factor undertakes, for a commission, to sell merchandise and
guarantee the sale.
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5. Where the holder ofan instrument for the payment of money, upon which
a third person is, or may become, liable to him, transfers it in payment of a precedent
debt of his own, or for a new consideration and in connection with such transfer,
enters into a promise respecting such instrument.
Idaho Code § 9-506

1. C. 9-506(1) applies here and makes this an original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine
Secretarial. Defendants received the credit card transaction from Accelerated and promised to apply
it to the debt to Mickelson Construction. That is an original promise and it need not be in writing.

1. C. 9-506(2) applies here and makes this an original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine
Secretarial. Mickelson Construction parted with value, namely agreed not to lien the project of
Accelerated and Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial agreed to facilitate the transaction thereby making
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial the primary debtor.

1. C. 9-506(3) applies here and makes this an original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine
Secretarial. Mickelson Construction released Accelerated Paving from his right to lien the project
and accepted Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial's check.

1. C. 9-506 makes the transaction here the original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine
Secretarial and it need not satisfy the requirements of 1. C. 9-505.
CONCLUSION
The check is sufficient to comply with the requirements ofl. C. 9-505, but should this Court
determine otherwise then the provisions ofl. C. 9-506 makes this transaction the original obligation
of Horrocks/Sunshine which need not comply with the requirements of 1. C. 9-505. Accordingly,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
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~

DATED this ~ day of January, 2011.

COOPER & LARSEN

L. COOPER

G

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~.

I hereby certify that on the \ '-\
of the foregoing to:

day of January, 2011, I served a true and correct copy

[~s.mail

Aaron N. Thompson
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
216 W Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello,ID 83204-0370

[]
[]
[]

Express mail
Hand delivery
Fax: 234-2961

[~.mail

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
District Judge
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E Center, Room 220
Pocatello, ID 83201

[]
[]
[]

Express mail
Hand delivery
Fax: 236-7012

G~COOPER
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Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar#1814
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED ?ffr
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,
•
P.O. Box 4229
c
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
c,
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
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Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
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Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
)
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES )
INC.,
)
)
Defendants
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

CASE NO. CV-2010-02757-0C

AFFIDAVIT OF

DELWYN MICKELSEN

)
:ss
)

DELWYN MICKELSEN, being fIrst duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the President of Mickelsen Construction, Inc. and make this affidavit ofmy own

personal knowledge and information.
2.

Mickelsen Construction, Inc. threatened to fIle a material lien against a project in

which Accelerated Paving, Inc. was involved.
3.

Alan Smith ofAccelerated Paving, Inc. came to Delwyn Mickelsen and requested that

Mickelsen Construction, Inc. not fIle the lien because that would prevent Accelerated Paving, Inc.
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from getting paid on the project. Alan Smith offered to pay by credit card but explained that he
would have to use the project payment to pay the balance on his credit card before he could obtain
the credit necessary to fund the credit card payment.
4.

Mickelsen Construction, Inc. agreed not to file the lien on the condition that Alan

Smith and Accelerated Paving, Inc. obtain someone to guarantee the payment by credit card which
was offered by Alan Smith and Accelerated Paving, Inc ..
5.

Defendant Lesa D. Horrocks agreed to guarantee the credit card payment of Alan

Smith and Accelerated Paying, Inc. and to do so wrote a check on the account of Sunshine
Secretarial Services, Inc. and Lesa D. Horrocks in the amount of $34,980.00 on January 8, 2009.
A copy of said check is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A".
6.

The check written by Lisa D. Horrocks on the account of Sunshine Secretarial

Services, Inc. and Lesa D. Horrocks bounced and despite numerous demands the checking account
on which the check was written never had sufficient funds for the check. Copies of letters from
Idaho Central Credit Union dated January 26, 2009 and January 27, 2009 are attached to the
Complaint as Exhibit "B".
7.

When I was contacted by Brent L. Grigg to accept payment by an American Express

credit card, I told Mr. Grigg I could not facilitate the transaction myself but the Bank of Commerce
in Blackfoot could. I spoke with Justin Hokansen at the Bank of Commerce and he agreed to
facilitate this transaction and when the funds were received from American Express they would be
deposited in my checking account and Lesa Horrock's check would be returned to her. It was never
discussed that the funds :from American Express would be given to Lesa Horrocks to cover the check
rather the funds were to go to the Bank of Commerce and I would return the check to Lesa Horrocks.
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8.

It was Brent L. Grigg, Accelerated Paving, Inc. and/or Lesa D. Horrocks and

Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., who chose not to use the services of Bank of Commerce after
I had left the meeting with Lesa Horrock's check.
9.

The reason I requested a post-dated check from someone other than Accelerated was

that previous checks from Accelerated would not clear the bank. Lesa D. Horrocks knowingly
agreed to write the check and by writing the check she assumed all risks associated therewith.
10.

Although the Affidavit of Brent L. Grigg states I was present when the card was ran

that is incorrect. When I left the meeting Brent L. Grigg was to go to Blackfoot to the Bank of
Commerce and run the American Express card. It was Brent L. Grigg and Lesa D. Horrocks who
chose to do otherwise and I was not present and that was not our agreement.
11.

I never agreed that Accelerated would run the American Express card through

Sunshine's credit card machine. The transaction was to have been done through the Bank of
Commerce.
12.

Lesa D. Horrocks was present when Brent 1. Grigg informed her that the American

Express credit card would be ran through the Bank of Commerce, that I was requesting a check to
guarantee the funds in the event the funds did not go through and that once the funds were deposited
in my account the check would be returned to Lesa D. Horrocks. Lesa D. Horrocks and Sunshine
Secretarial Services, Inc. assumed all risk when writing the check and then knowingly changed the
transaction by running the transaction through Sunshine's credit card machine rather than through
the Bank of Commerce as previously agreed.
13.

Brent 1. Grigg notified me on or before January 14,2009, that the transaction did not

go through and asked for additional time to work out an arrangement with American Express. I
honored that request and it was not until January 26,2009, that I attempted to cash the check.
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14.

At no time was Alan Smith present during these negotiations.

15.

I disagree with the Affidavit of Lesa Horrocks in that when she was approached by

Brent L. Grigg the transaction was to be run through the Bank of Commerce not through her credit
card machine. It was not until after I left the meeting that Brent L. Grigg and Lesa Horrocks changed
the terms of the transaction.
16.

The transaction was approved to go through the Bank of Commerce and Lesa D.

Horrocks assumed all risk by allowing the transaction to be changed and run through Sunshine's
credit card machine.
17.

At no time was the transaction to have been run through Sunshine's credit card

machine but rather the credit card was to have been run through the Bank of Commerce and therefore
no money would have been sent to Lesa D. Horrocks to cover the check but rather deposited in my
account by the Bank of Commerce and the check returned to Lesa D. Horrocks.
18.

Lesa D. Horrocks assumed all liability when she wrote a check to Mickelsen

Construction on behalf of Accelerated Paving.
19.

I disagree with the Affidavit of Alan Smith in that my bank declined to run the

transaction. The Bank of Commerce agreed to facilitate the transaction and deposit the funds from
American Express into my account. See Affidavit of Justin Hokanson filed herewith.
20.

The transaction which I agreed to did not involve the credit card being run through

Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. but rather was to have been run through the Bank of Commerce.
DATED this

1'1 day of January, 201
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

I~

+k-

day of January, 2011.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at Pocatello
My commission expires:

b -oL - J- 0 l (

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
of the foregoing to:

14~f January, 2011, I served a true and correct copy
[~S.mail

Aaron N. Thompson
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
216 W Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370

[]
[]
[]

[~mail

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
District Judge
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E Center, Room 220
Pocatello, ID 83201

[]
[]
[]

Express mail
Hand delivery
Fax: 236-7012

L.COOPER

G
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Express mail
Hand delivery
Fax: 234-2961
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Gary L. Cooper· tdlSho SEa.tSar #1814
COOPER. &. LAn.SEN~ CHAR1'ERED
lS1 North. Third Avenue, Second Ploor
P.O. Box 4229
Poc3tellot 10 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235·1145
Facsimile:

(208) 235- t 182

IN THE DISTRTCT COURt OF THE SIXTH JUDiCIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE Of IDAHO, IN AND FOR. THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
:MICKELSBN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintif'r,
VS.

CASE NO. CV·l01 0-027S7..QC

AFFmAVITOF
JUSTIN HOKANSON

LESA DARLENE HORR.OCl{S and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES )
)
INC ••

)
)
)

Defendants
STATE OF IDAHO

County of 'Bingham

)
:ss
)

JUSTIN HOKANSON, being titstduLy sworn on oath, deposeA and states as follows:
I.

1 am the Senior Vice President of Bank of Commerce and. make this affidAvit ofmy

own personal knowl£dic and info.tmation.
2.

I was contacted by Delwyn Mickelsen of Mickelsen Constructio~ Inc. md asked if

an American Express credit

~ard

could be run through the Bank of Commeroe and. the funds

deposited into the account of Mickelsen Construction. Inc.
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-

PAGJ; 1

52

.....,

_. . . . ,. ""'V.

3.

J....::.;);;;J-

r ..
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T infonncd Delwyn Mickelsen that the Bank. of Commerce would facilitate this

tTansactioD. and. it was my understanding that a representative of Acgelera.ted Paving, !nc., would
come to Blackfoot and run the transactioll. A representative of Accelerated Pavins. Inc. did not

come to the bank and complete the ~on.
DATED thi~ I flli day of Jan:uary, 2011.

~-

ruSflN HOKANSON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

I tt

day of January, 2011.

~~
T JY PUBLTC FOR-IDAHO

(SEAL)

Residing at Blackfoot
My commission expires:t;3/bfIJ/~ I S-

CElITfFICAIE QI'SERVI'CE

1 hereby oertify that all the
of the forcgoil'lg to!

1~{

day of 1anuary, 2011~ I served a true and correct cop)'

[x
11

Aaron N. n10mpscm
May~ .R.ammell & Thompson:. Chanered
216 W Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pooatello,lO 83204-0370

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
Ditmet Judge

B:mnock County Courthouse

[ ]

Hand deliv~ry

rx.l

Fax: 234..2961

f~

U.S. mail
Express mail
Hand delivery
Fax: 236·7012

M

624 E Center, Room 220
Pocatel1o~ ID 8320 I

U,S.mlll

Express mail
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TOTAL P.003

Aaron N. Thompson, Esq.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 West Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 6235
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C

vs.

DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF TO
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM AND
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
INC.,
Defendant.

Defendants Lesa Daralene Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by and
through their counsel of record, Aaron N. Thompson of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson,
Chartered, hereby submits this Reply Brief in response to Plaintiffs Memorandum. This matter
is currently set for hearing on January 31,2011 before the Honorable Judge Dunn.

I.

ARGUMENT

In the Affidavit of Delwyn Mickelsen, Mr. Mickelsen agrees that the only debt at issue
was what Accelerated Paving owed Mickelsen Construction. There was a contract of some sort
between Accelerated and Mickelsen.

Prior to January, 2009, there is no allegation that

SunshinelHorrocks owed any debt to Mickelsen.
Mickelsen Construction threatened to file a Materialmen's Lien on a project completed
at Accelerated Paving's request. Id. Therefore, initially, there was no privity between Mickelsen
and SunshinelHorrocks.
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-Alt-admit-ttlere was-a-conversation held between Mickelsen, Sunshine, and Accelerated
in January, 2009. As a result, Accelerated agreed to pay Mickelsen by using its' business
American Express credit card. Sunshine, acting as a facilitator, relying upon American Express
to cover the check, ran the transaction and wrote a check to Mickelsen with the express
understanding that American Express would immediately compensatee Sunshine for the
transaction.
Mickelsen states in its Complaint, in Paragraph VII, "Defendant Lesa D. Horrocks
agreed to guarantee the credit card payment of Alan Smith and Acclerated Paying(sic), Inc., and

to do so wrote a check ....,,1 Therefore, by virtue of its' own pleadings, Mickelsen is alleging
that this is an assumption/guarantee contract.

Mickelsen, and Micklesen alone, carries the

burden of proving the claims it alleges in its' pleadings. Furthermore, it should be noted that
Mickelsen's Complaint is void of any other claims, including one for any other contractual
relationship, absent the assumption/guarantee contract aforementioned.
There was absolutely no writing that establishes Lesa Horrocks or Sunshine Secretarial
Services, Inc. would assume this Acclerated debt. To avoid Summary Judgment, Mickelsen must
come forward with some evidence that SunshinelHorrocks agreed to assume andlor guarantee
this debt. Also, in order to prove this claim, Mickelsen must come forward with some evidence
that a contract exists between Mickelsen and Sunshine/Horrocks.
Mickelsen argues this assumption/guarantee contract does not fit within the Statute of
Frauds for basically two reasons. One, Mickelsen asserts that it is an assumption contract, but the
check is sufficient to fulfill the writing requirements. For the reasons stated in Defendants'
Initial Brief, this is simply incorrect. Second, Mickelsen tries to sidestep the Statute of Frauds by
using the

I.e.

§ 9-506 statutory exceptions.

These exceptions do not apply to this case.

Assuming arguendo that this was an assumption/guarantee contract that does not require a
writing, Mickelsen still carries the burden to prove a contract exists as to Mickelsen and
SunshinelHorrocks.
There is no contract here, regardless oUhe Statute of Frauds. Mickelsen cannot possibly

succeed in a contract claim. Mickelsen goes to great measure in his Affidavit to state that he did
not agree to anything regarding American Express, and that he believed that the transaction
would occur through the Bank of Commerce. He avers that SunshinelHorrocks "assumed the
1 Mickelsen

Complaint.
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assume any risk at all in this relationship? This was not SunshinelHorrocks' debt. Mickelson
would receive all of the benefit. This was a great deal for Mickelsen - but where exactly is the
mutuality of obligation? What benefit did SunshineIHorrocks receive from Mickelsen, in any
fashion, for writing this check? The Plaintiffs affidavits are absent of this evidence - primarily
because there is none.
In order for there to be a valid contract, between Mickelsen and SunshineIHorrocks,
there must be an offer, acceptance, and consideration. There is no offer or acceptance here.
There is absolutely no consideration. What exactly would SunshinelHorrocks gain by writing
this check to Mickelsen?

Mickelsen is really asserting that SunshinelHorrocks unilaterally

assumed a debt, by which she had no obligation, paid Mickelsen a $35,000.00 check, just to join
into the obligation "party". Lesa Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. gained
absolutely nothing by facilitating this transaction. There is absolutely no consideration, and
frankly, there was no offer. SunshinelHorrocks was doing nothing but acting as an intermediate
facilitator.
This case must be examined in context.

Mickelsen knows the true obligor of the

underlying debt - Accelerated Paving. Mickelsen knows it cannot sue Accelerated Paving,
because Accelerated has filed and discharged this debt via bankruptcy. Rather than chalking this
up to a bad business decision, Mickelsen elects to sue SunshineIHorrocks.

Mickelsen had no

contract whatsoever with SunshinelHorrocks.
Even if this transaction falls outside of the Statute of Frauds (which SunshinelHorrocks
does not concede), it still fails, and dismissal is necessary.
The check does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff seems to imply by writing a

personal check, that this check is sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The check is not
enough. There must be a sufficient memorandum to comply with the Statute of Frauds, pursuant
to Idaho Code § 9-505(2). For various policy reasons, the Idaho State Legislature requires a
sufficient writing, note or memorandum that incorporates the understanding of the parties.
If Mickelsen admits that there was no assumption contract, and agrees with that portion
of the Horrocks' affidavit, it would be impossible for Mickelsen to prove there was an
assumption/guarantee contract as asserted in his pleadings.
Mickelsen misses the point in his attempted distinction of the Hoffman case. Hoffman v.
CASENO:CV-2010-2757-0C-DEFENDANTS'REPLYBRIEFTOPLAINTIFF'SMEMORANDUMAND
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however, a Statute of Frauds case. It is also on point with regard to whether a personal check
fulfills the Statue of Frauds requirements. The Hemingway court clearly states that a check
doesn't satisfy the memorialization of an oral contract, defming specific terms. The check, in
and of itself, is not a sufficient, "note or memorandum" to comply with the Statue of Frauds.
The sale of real property requires a writing. So does a personal guarantee contract. It is not for
this Court to decide why the legislature has required both to be in writing, but it certainly has
defined a writing to be something more than a check.

There has to be a memorandum or a

sufficient writing, defining essential terms.
The l. C. 9-506 are factually and legally inapplicable. Also, in an attempt to bypass the

Statue of Frauds, Plaintiff cites Idaho Code § 9-506 and tries to "wiggle" the fact pattern to meet
one of the conditions requiring that the Statute of Frauds need not apply.

Each of these

exceptions anticipate entirely different situations than what is presented. These exceptions, to the
letter, simply do not apply to the fact pattern in this case.
Even if, Plaintiff was successful in arguing that this is not an assumption contract that
falls within the Statute of Frauds, it simply cannot meet the elements of a contract by failure of
offer, acceptance and consideration. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, regardless of
the theory.
DATED

fuis2-~Y of January, 2011

MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
Attorneys for De
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Defendants' Reply Brief to Plaintiff's
Memorandum and Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following
named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.

Gary L. Cooper
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

DATED this

~Mail

[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

~ay of January, 2011
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Register#CV-201 0-2757-0C
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY mDGMENT

-------------------------------)
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant
to I.R.c.P. Ru1e 56 ("Motion"). A hearing was held regarding the Motion on January 31,2011.
After careful review of the arguments and record, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for
the reasons stated herein.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw.'" I.R.C.P.56(c); Arreguin v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 460, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008); Northwest Bee-Corp
v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838,41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002); see also Cox v. Clanton,

137 Idaho 492, 494, 50 P.3d 987, 989 (2002).

When considering a motion for summary
,i'''!''',

judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor \ ~:
0) <~.'
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of the nonmoving party. Id. (citing S. Griffin Contr., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181,
185, 16 P.3d 278,282 (2000)). Normally, summary judgment_must be denied where reasonable
persons could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence
presented. Id.
The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.
Northwest Bec-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 267. To meet this burden, the moving party

must challenge, in its motion, and establish through evidence that no issue of material facts exists
on an element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." Id. (quoting IRCP 56 (e)). Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the
moving party, when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Smith v. Meridian
Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996).

Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994).

This standard is set out in a United States Supreme Court case which has been adopted by the
Idaho Supreme Court:
The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at triaL In such a situation, there
can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial. The moving party is entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law ...
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Cel/otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (see Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102

(1998)). Thus, a responding party cannot raise meritless defenses or claims to defeat Summary
Judgment. Rather, a Defendant must introduce facts into the record that support each element of
each defense or claim asserted.
Summary judgment is mandated when a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
LR.C.P., Rule 56(a); Myers v. A.a. Smith Harvestor Products, Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 437 (Ct.
App. 1988). That is, if there is no cognizable claim or defense, then no genuine issues of
material fact are at issue and, as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment should be
granted.
Even if the facts are not disputed, that does not always mean that summary judgment is
proper. In Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028, 1030, 695 P.2d 413, 415 (CLApp. 1985), the Idaho
Court of Appeals stated:
[T]he Idaho Supreme Court has held that even though there are no genuine issues of
material facts between the parties a motion for summary judgment must be denied, when
the case is to be tried to a jury, if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be
drawn therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions. Riverside
Development Company v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982).
See also Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 326,411 P.2d 768, 770 (1966)("A motion for summary

judgment must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn
therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions.") Likewise, if the record
raises questions concerning the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence, a motion
for summary judgment must be denied. Altman v. Arndt, 109 Idaho 218, 706 P.2d 107 (Ct.App.
1985)(citing Merrill v. Duffy Reed Construction Co., 82 Idaho 410,353 P.2d 657 (1960)).
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Accelerated Paving, Inc. ("Accelerated") had a contractual relationship with Mickelsen,
from which Accelerated owed Mickelsen $34,980.00 for services rendered by Mickelsen on a
particular job site. When Accelerated did not pay, Mickelsen threatened to file a materialmen's
lien against the real property to secure the funds. Alan Smith ("Smith"), Vice President of
Accelerated, asked Mickelsen to not file the lien because it would prevent Accelerated from
getting paid on the project. Delwyn testified that he would not accept payment by Accelerated's
American Express credit card unless someone else would guarantee the payment.

Delwyn

asserts that Lesa D. Horrocks, partial owner of Sunshine Secretarial Services,2 agreed to
guarantee the Accelerated credit card payment by writing a check from an account that lists
Horrocks and Sunshine as the account holders. The check was in the amount $34, 980.00 and
was dated January 8, 2009. 3
According to Delwyn, he told Brent L. Grigg ("Grigg"), general manager of Accelerated,
that he could not facilitate a credit card transaction himself, but the Bank of Commerce in
Blackfoot could. Delwyn states that he spoke with Justin Hokansen ("Hokansen") of the Bank of
Commerce, and Hokansen agreed to facilitate the transaction and when the funds were received
from American Express, they would be deposited into Mickelsen's checking account and
Horrocks' check would be returned to her. Hokansen confirms that he informed Delwyn that the
Bank of Commerce would facilitate the transaction, but states that a representative of
Accelerated never came to the bank to complete the transaction. 4

1 The facts set forth below are taken from the affidavits filed by the parties and related witnesses, primarily the
affidavit of Delwyn Mickelsen ("Delwyn"). Specific references to the particular affidavits are not made unless
deemed necessary by the Court, for emphasis. As set forth above, alLfacts..are construed in favor of the non-moving
party, Mickelsen Construction, Inc. ("Mickelsen").
2 Defendants shall be collectively referred to as "Horrocks."
3 A copy of the check is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A. It is made payable to Mickelsen Construction and
the "For" line lists "Accel."
4 Hokansen Aff. p. 2, ~ 3.
--Page 4
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Delwyn alleges that in a meeting between himself, Grigg, and Horrocks, Grigg agreed to
go to Blackfoot to the Bank of Commerce and run the American Express card. Then after
Delwyn left the meeting, Delwyn states that Grigg and Horrocks decided to change the
agreement and run the American Express card at Sunshine's office on Sunshine's credit card
machine. Delwyn asserts that at no time did he ever agree to have the credit card transaction run
at Sunshine's office. Delwyn claims that Horrocks kriowingly agreed to write the check to
guarantee the funds in the event the credit card funds did not go through, and that once the funds
were deposited in Delwyn's account, the check would be returned to Horrocks.
Delwyn asserts that Grigg notified him on or before January 14,2009, that the credit card
transaction did not go through and asked for additional time to work out an arrangement with
American Express. Delwyn granted the request and it was not until January 26, 2009, that
Delwyn attempted to cash the check. The check bounced and despite numerous demands by
Delwyn, the checking account on which the check was written never had sufficient funds to
cover the check. 5 Thus, Mickelsen never received payment from Accelerated, Horrocks, or
Sunshine and has filed this case to recover against Horrocks and Sunshine. 6
Because it is relied on by Mickelsen, the Court notes Horrocks' assertion that, at
Accelerated's request, she ran their American Express card through her machine with the
understanding that once that credit card transaction was funded, Mickelsen would then cash her
check in satisfaction of Accelerated's debt to Mickelsen.
It is also noted that Horrocks, Grigg and Smith all agree that Horrocks received no

benefit or consideration for her "facilitation" of Accelerated's attempt to pay its debt to
Mickelsen. Mickelsen does not dispute this fact and it is accepted by the Court as undisputed.

5 Copies of letters from the Idaho Central Credit Union, stating that the account has insufficient funds, dated January
26,2009 and January 27, 2009, are attached to the Complaint as Exhibit B.
6 Apparently, Accelerated as taken out bankruptcy and discharged its obligation to Mickelsen there.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Although generally a question of fact will preclude a summary judgment, the issue here is
whether any alleged agreement of Horrocks to guarantee the Accelerated debt, is enforceable as
7

a matter of law. Horrocks asserts, and Mickelsen agrees, that in the case of a special promise or
guarantee to answer for the debt of another, there must be a writing sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds, pursuant to I.C. § 9-505(2). The only writing referenced
by either side is the check itself. Horrocks asserts that a written check does not satisfy the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Mickelsen argues that ifI.C. § 9-505(2) applies, then the check is a sufficient writing and
satisfies the Statute of Frauds.
Secondarily, Mickelsen also claims, based on Horrocks affidavit, that no writing is
required because Horrocks' actions of running Accelerated's credit card and providing a check to
Mickelsen created and confirms an "original obligation," pursuant to I.C. § 9-506, which is an
exception to the Statute of Frauds. The Court will first address the "original obligation"
contention and then address whether the check is a sufficient writing under I.C. § 9-505(2).
1. Does I.C.§ 9-506 apply?

Mickelsen relies on subsections 1,2, and 3, ofIdaho Code § 9-506, which state:
Original obligations - Writing not needed. - A promise to answer for the obligation of
another, in any of the following cases, is deemed an original obligation of the promisor,
and need not be in writing:
1. Where the promise is made by one who has received property of another upon an
undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise; or by one who has received a discharge
from an obligation in whole or in part, in consideration of such promise.
2. Where the creditor parts with value, or enters into an obligation, in consideration of the
obligations in respect to which the promise is made, in terms or under circumstances such
as to render the party making the promise the principal debtor, and the person in whose
behalf it is made, his surety.
7 The various affidavits, particularly of Delwyn and Horrocks, create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Horrocks guaranteed the Accelerated debt. If that was the only issue upon which the summary judgment motion
was based, the motion would be denied. But, as noted above, that is not the primary issue raised by the motion. For
purposes of this opinion, the Court accepts as true that Horrocks agreed to guarantee the Accelerated debt.
--Page 6
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3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made upon the
consideration that the party receiving it cancels the antecedent obligation, accepting the
new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the consideration that the party receiving it
releases the property of another from a levy, or his person from imprisonment under an
execution on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent obligation; or upon a
consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either party to the
antecedent obligation, or from another person.
Mickelsen's argues that these subsections apply to the facts of this case as follows:
1. I.C. § 9-506(1) applies because Defendants received the credit card transaction from
Accelerated and promised to apply it to the debt owed to Mickelsen.
2. I.C. § 9-506(2) applies because Mickelsen parted with value, namely agreed not to
lien the project of Accelerated and Horrocks/Sunshine agreed to facilitate the
transaction thereby making Horrocks/Sunshine the primary debtor.
3. I.C. § 9-506(3) applies because Mickelsen released Accelerated from its right to lien
the project and accepted Defendants' check. 8
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
Whether an oral promise constitutes a collateral or an original obligation, for the purposes
of the statute of frauds, is generally a question for the fmder of fact. Dalby v. Kennedy, 94
Idaho 72, 481 P.2d 30 (1971). See also Wright v. Wright, 97 Idaho 439, 546 P.2d 394
(1976). The trial judge is the arbiter of whether the evidence indicating an original
obligation is sufficient to allow the statute of frauds question to go to the jury. McQuade
v. Edward Rutledge Timber Co., 46 Idaho 471, 268 P. 570 (1928).
Beaupre v. Kingen, 109 Idaho 610, 614, 710 P.2d 520, 524 (1985).

While no Idaho case is completely similar to this case, there are several Idaho cases that
offer guidance in interpreting I.C. § 9-506. In Treasure Valley Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v.
Earth Resources Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 373, 766 P.2d 1254 (Ct.App.1988), a construction

subcontractor, Treasure Valley Plumbing and Heating, Inc. ("Treasure Valley"), brought an
action to foreclose a mechanic's lien for work performed on a silver mine. The silver mine was
predominantly owned by Earth Resources Company ("Earth Resources") and Treasure Valley
was hired by the general contractor, Mountain States Mineral Enterprises, Inc. ("Mountain
States"), to install necessary plumbing and a water supply system to the silver mine. Treasure
Valley brought a lawsuit against Earth Resources and Mountain States claiming that it was
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underpaid and that the owner, Earth Resources, had made assurances or a guarantee to pay at
least some of Mountain States debts to Treasure Valley.
The Idaho Court of Appeals found that Earth Resources' promise to pay for certain work
was an original promise. In arriving at that conclusion, the court followed a legal doctrine called
the "main purpose rule." The court states:
Courts have resolved these disputes in different ways. The majority-and in our opinion
the better-view applies the "main purpose" rule to this scenario. See RESTATEMENT
OF SECURITY § 93 (1941). The main purpose rule provides that where the promisor
(the owner) "has for his object a benefit which he did not enjoy before his promise, which
benefit accrues immediately to himself, his promise is original, whether made before,
after or at the time of the promise of the third party (the general contractor),
notwithstanding that the effect is to promise to payor discharge the debt of another."
Nelson v. Boynton, 44 Mass. 396 (1841) (quoted inGALAMARI AND PERILLO § 19-6
at p. 685). In order for the rule to apply, there must be consideration for the owner's
promise and the consideration must be beneficial to him.

Id. 9 The court found that Earth Resources (the owner) made a pledge to pay Treasure Valley and
that it received beneficial consideration for that guarantee. Accordingly, the court held that the
agreement between Treasure Valley and Earth Resources was an original promise.
In Reed v. Samuels, 43 Idaho 55,249 P. 893 (1926), an action was brought to recover
money damages. Reed alleged that Samuels, a stockholder of a corporation, promised to pay the
debt of the third party corporation to Reed in exchange for Reed agreeing to remit accrued
interest on a sum of$9,000 and reduce his claim from $10,000 to $8,000.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that:
Any promise to pay the debt of a third party, whether or not in writing, must be founded
upon a consideration in order to be binding. McKenzie v. Puget Sound Nat. Bank, 9

8
9

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p.5.
See also 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 125 which states:
Another test which may be employed to determine whether a promise is within the statute of frauds is
whether the promisor becomes a guarantor or surety; in an attempt to tie such a test to the "collateral" and
"original" promise framework, it has been said that a collateral undertaking to which the statute of frauds
applies is one in which the promisor is merely a surety or guarantor, receives no direct benefit, and is liable
only if the debtor defaults. [Emphasis added].
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Wash., 442,37 P. 668,43 Am. St. Rep. 844. There was no consideration moving to
respondent.
The rule is stated in Curtis v. Brown, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 488, 491, as follows:
'It is not sufficient ground to prevent the operation of the statute of frauds that the
plaintiff has relinquished an advantage; or given up a lien, in consequence of the
defendant's promise, if that advantage has not also directly inured to the benefit of the
defendant, so as in effect to make it a purchase by the defendant of the plaintiff. * * * The
cases in which it has been held otherwise are those where the plaintiff, in consideration of
the promise, has relinquished some lien, benefit, or advantage for securing or recovering
his debt, and where by means of such relinquishment, the same interest or advantage has
inured to the benefit of the defendant. '
43 Idaho at 57,249 P. at 895 (emphasis added by this Court). The court found that Samuels was
merely acting as an agent of the corporation and that he received no direct benefit, "other than
such as inured to the stockholders generally." Id Accordingly, Samuels' promise to pay the
corporation's debt if Reed would reduce the claim, did not create an original obligation of the
promisor within any of the exceptions of the Statute of Frauds.
The analysis of these cases can be easily applied to the provisions ofLC. § 9-506:
1. Where the promise is made by one [Horrocks] who has received property of another
upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise; or by one who has received a
discharge from an obligation in whole or in part, in consideration of such promise.
2. Where the creditor [Mickelsen] parts with value, or enters into an obligation, in
consideration of the obligations in respect to whichJtt~romise is made, in terms or
under circumstances such as to render the party making the promise [Horrocks] the
principal debtor, and the person in whose behalf it is made [Accelerated], his surety.
3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another [Accelerated], is
made upon the consideration that the party receiving it [Mickelsen] cancels the
antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the
consideration that the party receiving it releases the property of another from a levy,
or his person from imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained upon the
antecedent obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor [Horrocks],
whether moving from either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another person.
In each of these exceptions to the Statute of Frauds, as noted in the appellate cases, the
promise to pay the debt of another is valid only when the promisor, Horrocks in this case,
receives property or a discharge of its own obligation (subsection 1); pursuant to terms and
considerations which makes the promisor, Horrocks, the principle debtor, and the original debtor,
Accelerated, a surety (subsection 2); or when there is a promise to pay an antecedent obligation,
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Accelerated's debt, (which is the actual circumstance in this case), in exchange for beneficial
consideration to the promisor, Horrocks. In short, Horrocks must substitute itself as the primary
obligor in exchange for valid consideration and benefits, to have created an original obligation to
pay the debt of another. In this case, even if Horrocks agreed to guarantee the credit card
payment of Accelerated, Mickelsen has failed to show that Horrocks received any benefit by
entering into this agreement. The only benefit Mickelsen notes in writing is an agreement to not
file a lien against the property of another. 10 That is not a relinquishment of Accelerated's debt
and does not benefit Horrocks at all. In fact, there is no suggestion here that any of the actions of
the various parties was ever intended to relieve Accelerated as the primary obligor of the debt to
Mickelsen. As noted in Reed, any agreement by Mickelsen to not file a lien is insufficient to
prevent the operation of the Statute of Frauds if that agreement has not also directly bestowed a
benefit upon Horrocks. The Court concludes that Horrocks' promise to guarantee the
Accelerated debt does not create an original obligation, and I.e. § 9-506 does not apply so as to
prevent the need for a sufficient writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

2. Is the check a sufficient writing under I.C. § 9-505(2)?
Idaho Code § 9-505 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 9-505. Certain agreements to be in writing- In the following cases the agreement is
invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except
in the cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho Code.
In Idaho, I.C. § 9-505 is strictly construed. Kerr v. Finch, 25 Idaho 32,135 P. 1165 (1913);
Kratzer v. Day, 12 F.2d 724 (9 th Cir. 1926).

10 At oral argument, counsel for Mickelsen noted that the benefit to Horrocks was helping a party she had a business
relationship with, as Horrocks affidavit shows that Accelerated subleased property occupied by Horrocks and paid
rent for that sublease. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Horrocks agreed to guarantee the debt because
of that relationship.
Case No. CV-1O-2757 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
--Page 10

68

Mickelsen argues that the check written by Horrocks is a sufficient writing to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds, stating: "It is signed by Lesa Horrocks; it is made payable to Mickelson [sic]
Construction; is for $34,980; and identifies that it is 'For Accel.' which is sufficient to identify
Accelerated Paving."l1 Mickelsen asserts that because the statute simply requires "some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged," the check meets the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
Horrocks asserts that the check alone is insufficient, citing Hemingway v. Gruner, 106
Idaho 422,679 P.2d 1140 (1984), where the Idaho Supreme Court, in a case involving an alleged
oral agreement to purchase real estate, found that a $7,500 check lacked essential elements and
was "insufficient to take the transaction out of the operation of the statute of frauds." 106 Idaho
at 425,679 P.2d at 1143. Horrocks also cites Hoffman v. Sv. Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187,628 P.2d
218 (1981), which was relied on in Hemingway, where the court held that a $5,000 check,
standing alone, was insufficient to satisfy the statute of fraudsJn a purchase of real estate case.
102 Idaho at 190, 628 P .2d at 221.
Mickelsen argues that Horrocks' reliance on Hoffman (and by reference the argument
would also apply to Hemingway) is misplaced, asserting that Hoffman is different from the case
at hand because Hoffman dealt with the purchase and sale of real property with numerous
component parts, and the only notation on the check was the phrase, "Escrow Ruud Mtn. Lots."
As noted above, Mickelsen's position is that this case deals with a simple guaranty and that the
check contains enough information to be a sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds.
The Court disagrees. In a case not involving the purchase of real estate, but involving an
alleged guarantee, the Idaho Court of Appeals has found that a check did not rise to the level of a

II

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3.
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written guaranty. In Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho
890,693 P.2d 1092 (Ct.App.1984),12 a lender was unable to perfect its security interest in an
automobile because it never received a document of title to the car. The lender brought an action
against both the buyer and seller of the car to determine whether an obligation recited upon the
back of a check issued by the lender to the buyer and seller as copayees was binding on both
payees. The check contained the following language:
This check represents the proceeds of a loan. You are obligated to furnish a negotiable
title to the vehicle or mobile home: Description 1979 AMC Jeep LD. $ J8F83EH132729
within thirty days after endorsement of this check. Failure to furnish a negotiable title
will constitute liability for any expense required to procure.
107 Idaho at 892, 693 P.2d at 1094.
As to the obligations of the seller, the court held:
The question, then, is narrowed to the application of contract law to undisputed facts. It
long has been settled that no enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the
minds and embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties. E.g., Phelps v.
Good, 15 Idaho 76, 96 P. 216 (1908). The contract must be specific enough to show that
the parties shared a mutual intent. Barnes v. Huck, 97 Idaho 173,540 P.2d 1352 (1975).
In general, a contract also must create a mutuality of obligation. Green v. Beaver State
Contractors, Inc., 93 Idaho 741, 472 P.2d 307 (1970).
The district court ruled, and we agree, that the requisites for an enforceable contract have
not been established in this case. The language imprinted on the check fails to specify
what obligation, if any, is imposed on the seller. It recites only that "[y]ou are obligated
to furnish negotiable title to the vehicle .... " It does not identify the party addressed by the
term "you" and it does not state to whom the title must be delivered. This vague
language, unaccompanied by any other communication between the lender and seller,
fails to show a meeting of the minds or a distinct understanding common to both parties.
We cannot discern any mutual intent shared by the seHer and the lender. Neither does the
imprinted language provide a mutuality of obligation. The lender undertook nothing, and
did nothing, specifically for the seller. The lender simply disbursed a loan pursuant to an
existing agreement with the borrower.
Of course, the lack of separate consideration for the seller would not be fatal if the
imprinted language created an otherwise valid guaranty agreement. In such an agreement
the extension of credit to a debtor is deemed sufficient consideration for the guarantor.
Bank a/Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 647 P.2d 776 (Ct.App.1982). But the language
12 Also, in Hilt v. Draper, 122 Idaho 612, 836 P.2d 558 (Ct.App. 1992), the court found that, "The check by itself
does not create a contract." 122 Idaho at 622,836 P.2d at 568.
--Page 12
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on the check in this case does not rise to the level of a guaranty agreement. Although no
particular wording is necessary to create a guaranty, it must satisfy the fundamental
requisites of mutual understanding and definiteness applicable to any contract. See cases
cited in 38 AMJUR.2d Guaranty §§ 5,26, 37 (1968). Moreover, our Supreme Court has
declared that even where valid guaranty agreements exist, they must be strictly construed
and not extended beyond the express limits of the instruments creating them. Industrial
Investment Corp. v. Rocca, 100 Idaho 228,596 P.2d 100 (1979). A fortiori, no guaranty
agreement can be created by the express terms of an instrument that falls short of
establishing the requisites of a valid contract.
107 Idaho at 893-94, 693 P .2d at 1095-96 (emphasis added).
In this case, the Court concludes, consistent with Gulf Chemical, that the check alone
fails to show a meeting of the minds or show that the parties shared a mutual intent. The check
in Gulf Chemical was far more specific than what is present here, but it was still insufficient.
The check in this case fails to specify the terms of the obligation by each party. In this case, as
in Gulf Chemical, "[t]he [Plaintiff] undertook nothing, and did nothing, specifically for the
[Defendants]." Id As stated in Hoffman, and confirmed in Gulf Chemical: "[N]o guaranty
agreement can be created by the express terms of an instrument that falls short of establishing the
requisites of a valid contract." Id "[A] memorandum must plainly set forth the parties to the
contract, the subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property and
all the essential terms and conditions of the agreement." Hoffman, 102 Idaho at 190,628 P.2d at
221 (emphasis added).l3 All the check issued by Hoffman does in this case is identify some type

See also Restatement of Contracts § 207, which states:
A memorandum, in order to make enforceable a contract within the Statute, may be any document or
writing, formal or informal, signed by the party to be charged or by his agent actually or apparently
authorized thereunto, which states with reasonable certainty,
(a) each party to the contract either by his own name, or by such a description as will serve to identifY him,
or by the name or description of his agent, and
(b) the land, goods or other subject-matter to which the contract relates, and
(c) the terms and conditions of all the promises constituting the contract and by whom and to whom the
promises are made.
See also 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty, § 5: "For an instrument to be enforceable as a guaranty, it must show, with
reasonable clarity, an intent to be liable on an obligation in case of a default by the primary obligor, and the
agreement must contain the express conditions of that liability and the obligations of each party within the four
comers of the document. That undertaking must be clear and explicit."
13
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of payment from Hoffman to Mickelsen, without clearly and explicitly setting forth that it is a
guarantee and what the terms and conditions of that guarantee are. Delwyn'S affidavit fills in the
blanks, as it were, from Mickelsen's perspective, but those assertions cannot be considered if the
writing upon which they are based is insufficient. The check lacks essential elements of a
guarantee contract. Therefore, the Court finds that the check, standing alone, is insufficient to
satisfy the requirements ofLC. § 9-505.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Horrocks' alleged
promise to guarantee the Accelerated debt does not create an original obligation, and I.C. § 9-506
does not apply to this case. In addition, the check is an insufficient writing to satisfy the
requirements ofl.C. § 9-505. Even if Horrocks did promise to guarantee the Accelerated debt,
which is factually disputed but accepted as true for purposes of this motion, that promise is
unenforceable, as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Summary Judgment to the
Defendants on all issues and claims in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

M

day of.r-e6YKM1i ,2011.

~Mr=
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L

0rb

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of
,2011, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.

(~U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Gary L. Cooper
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Aaron Thompson
MA Y, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 West Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370
DATED this

(1_

~ ,-

day OfL jeA.,)

({u.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

,2011.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRI

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Register#CV-20IO-2757-0C
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT

------------------------------)
Pursuant to .aMemorandum Decision and Order dated the 2nd day of February, 2011, this
- .'

Court GRANTED the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendants, Lesa Darlene Horrocks
and Supshine Secretarial Services, Inc.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premises aforesaid,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that JUDGMENT be entered
in this matter in favor ofsaid Defendants and against the Plaintiff, Mickelsen Construction, Inc., and
this case is hereby DISMISSED.
DATED this

:;.d day of f;./).y~

,2011.

~

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L

3(1::::>

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day 0['...
,2011, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.
Gary L. Cooper
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

(iu.s. Mail

Aaron Thompson
MA Y, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 West Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello,ID 83204-0370

({u.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

DATED this

t

day of <.

1ch

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

,2011.

Deputy

c'fJ ~""

--Page 2

Case No. CV-1O-27S7 JUDGEMENT

75

/""•...,
\.-~)

Aaron N. Thompson, Esq.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 West Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 6235
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C

Plaintiff,
vs.

DEFENDANT HORROCKS AND
SUNSlDNE SECRETARIAL'S
MEMORANDUM FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS

LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
INC.,
Defendant.

Defendants Lesa Daralene Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by and
through their counsel of record, Aaron N. Thompson of the fIrm May, Rarnmell & Thompson,
Chartered respectfully submits this Memorandum Of Attorneys Fees And Costs. This
Memorandum is supported by the Affidavit Of Aaron N. Thompson Re: Attorneys Fees And Costs
and the Court record and file in this case.

BRIEF PROCEDURAL mSTORY
Plaintiff Mickelsen Construction, Inc. sued Defendants Sunshine Secretarial Services,
Inc. and Lesa Darlene Horrocks for breach of a guarantee contract, and alleged attorney's fees
and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-120.

Defendants filed and answer, and correspondingly,

requested attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the same section.

Summary Judgment was
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granted in favor of Defendants on February 2, 2011, and all of Plaintiff s claims were dismissed
as a result of that Judgment.

HORROCKS AND SUNSHINE HAVE APPROPRIATELY REQUESTED FEES
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 12-120.

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates an award of reasonable attorney's fees in commercial
transactions. While Horrocks/Sunshine believe it is reasonably clear that this case involves a
"commercial transaction" as defined by Idaho Code § 12-120(3). This alleged transaction was
between two corporations, and was certainly not a transaction for household purposes. The
nature of these proceedings and their governance by Idaho Code § 12-120(3), and thus
SunshineIHorrocks has clearly established that it/she has a basis for requesting fees in this case.
The legislature'S policy of awarding fees to a personin Horrocks/Sunshine's position is
clear. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is a deviation from the "American Rule" in which each side is
responsible for their own fees and costs. See e.g. Heller v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 578 (Idaho
1984). In response to Idaho Courts limiting attorney's fees in commercial transactions, the
statute was amended in 1986, broadening the definition of "commercial transaction". As stated in
Myers v. Verrmaas, 114 Idaho 85, 87 (Ct. App. 1998), "the automatic nature of an award under

I.C. § 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the underlining commercial agreement between
the parties. It establishes an entitlement." [emphasis added]. The policy of making nonbreaching parties "whole", and encouraging swift resolution of cases, so that lawsuits are
unnecessary is apparent.
Horrocks/Sunshine surely has a right to rely on a law specifically enacted to protect
people in itlher position, so that she does not have to exhaust her money enforcing a business
contract.

HORROCKS/SUNSIDNE IS THE PREVAILING PARTY AND IS ENTITLED FEES
AND COSTS

The bottom line is that Defendant prevailed on all essential elements of defending this
claim. Plaintiff asserted commercial contract claims against Defendant. The Court dismissed
that claim as a matter of law. Defendants are the prevailing parties.

CASE NO. 2010-2757-0C - DEFENDANT HORROCKS AND SUNSlDNE SECRETARIAL'S
MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 2

77

GIDDELINES
LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(b), in conjunction with LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) provides the guidelines for a
court's determination of who is a prevailing party and how reasonable attorney's fees are
determined. The determination of whether a party is a prevailing party is a matter of discretion.
Zenner v. Holcomb, 09.13 ISCRI (June 2009).

HORROCKlSUNSIllNE'S FEES ARE REASONABLE
Rule 1 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure calls for the rules to be applied so that
justice is served. Defendants were sued by Plaintiff, and the fees incurred were reasonable and
within the context of what she had to do to protect herself. The matter was handled in an
expeditious fashion.

Minimal discovery was done.

The matter was called for Summary

Judgment early in the proceedings, and well before any dispositive motion deadlines.
As explained in Meldco Inc. v. Hollytex Carpet Mills Inc., 118 Idaho 265 (Ct. App. 1990)
the amount of attorney's fees awarded should be determined by the application of the I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3) factors.

TIME AND LABOR REQIDRED
Per Zenner, Horrocks/ Sunshine's time and labor is a factor.

As previously stated,

Defendants kept discovery to a minimum, and invested maximum effort towards resolving the
legal issues via Summary Judgment. There was no undue delay associated with the case, nor
were there prolonged motions, etc. The time and labor required to bring this matter to fruition is
certainly reasonable given the circumstances.

THE NOVELTY AND DIFFICULTY OF THE QUESTIONS
This case did not involve a complex set of facts, but did present significant difficulty
from a research and drafting perspective. As was argued at Summary Judgment, there was
complexity involving whether this contract was subject to the Statute of Frauds. There was not
case law directly on point. This was a factor in the case.
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SKILLS REQUISITE TO PERFORM THE LEGAL SERVICE AND THE EXPERIENCE
AND ABILITY OF THE ATTORNEY IN THE PARTICULAR FIELD OF LAW
Mr. Thompson has nearly 11 years of legal experience. As stated, the facts were not

particularl y complicated in this case, but the legal issues were.

Opposing counsel is an

extremely skilled, respected and experienced trial attorney. This required counsel to be sharp to
achieve his client's desired result.

THE PREVAILING CHARGES FOR LIKE WORK
Based on 10 112 years of experience, the fees charged are similar to or less to others who
perform similar work with similar experience in this area.

WHETHER THE FEE IS FIXED OR CONTINGENT
The fee in this case is hourly. Horrocks/Sunshine will be forced to absorb the fees and
costs which Horrocks/Sunshine was required to incur in order to defend this case.

THE TIME LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE CLIENT OR BY THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
Not a factor in this case.

THE AMOUNT INVOLVED AND THE RESULTS OBTAINED
As in Zenner, the amount involved may have been relatively minor. The justiciable issue
was a $35,000 commercial transaction.

Horrocks/Sunshine could have been exposed to a

judgment that a small business is not capable of incurring and survive.

THE UNDESIRABILITY OF THE CASE
Given that the opposing party had able counsel, it was undesirable. This case created
quite a headache for the Defendants. This caused considerable fear for SunshinelHorrocks, a
very small business.

Counsel did not take a huge retainer in this case due to a hope that

Summary Judgment would be granted. Had the Summary Judgment failed, SunshinelHorrocks
would have been placed in the difficult situation of coming up with additional funds to finance
this litigating.
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THE NATURE AND LENGTH OF THE PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSmp WITH THE
CLIENT
The fees requested are not substantial. Horrocks/Sunshine have not been long-term
clients of May, Rammell, and Thompson, but for the limited purpose of handling this case.

AWARDS IN SIMILAR CASES
The Zenner case, supra, illustrates a correlation between small awards and large
attorney's fees. Defendant receives no judgment for successfully defending this suit. The only
thing that Defendants have gained by this case is an attorney's fee bill.

THE REASONABLE COST OF AUTOMATED LEGAL RESEARCH
This factor is included in the time spent researching cases and preparing the case.

ANY OTHER FACTOR wmCH THE COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE OF A
PARTICULAR CASE
A. A failure to award fees rewards Mickelsen.
Mickelsen knew the proper party here was Accelerated Paving. Horrocks was nothing
more than a facilitator of a transaction. For Mickelsen to escape being charged with fees, he
escapes with little to no responsibility for bringing this claim. Horrocks/Sunshine must be made
whole by the Court for this haphazardness, consistent with the policies established by I.C. 12120 and the supporting Idaho case law.

DATED this

L6- day of February, 2011.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD

~
c:

\,,)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Defendant Horrocks and Sunshine
Secretarial's Memorandum Of Fees And Costs was served on the following named persons at the
addresses shown an in the matter indicated.
Gary L. Cooper
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
DATED this

(b

[ il7.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

day of February, 2011.
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Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar #1814
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

)
)
Plaintiff/Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
)
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES )
INC.,
)
)
DefendantslRespondents.
)
)
TO:

CASE NO. CV-2010-02757-0C

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee Category/Amount: (1)($101)

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS, LESA DARLENE HORROCKS
AND SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES, INC. AND THEIR ATTORNEY, AARON
N. THOMPSON, P. O. BOX 370, POCATELLO, ID 83204; AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE OF HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Plaintiff!Appellant, Mickelsen Construction, Inc., appeals against

the above named Defendants/Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum
Decision and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment dated February 2, 2011, and Judgment dated
February 2,2011, which rulings were entered in the above entitled action on the dates stated above
by the Honorable Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge, presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL -PAGE 1
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2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments

or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1)
and/or II(a)(7), 1.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then intends to

assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal, including the following:
A.

The Court improperly applied the law contained in 1. C. §§9-505 and 9-506.

B.

The Court improperly concluded that a check is an insufficient note or
memorandum of an agreement to guarantee a debt.

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? NO.

5.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested? YES.

(b)

The Appellant requests preparation ofthe following portions of the reporter's
transcript:
January 31,2011 Hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

6.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 1.A.R.:
-.----~

A.

10-29-2010

B.

10-29-2010

C.

10-29-2010

D.

10-29-2010

E.

10-29-2010

F.

01-14-2011

G.
H.

01-14-2011
01-14-2011

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to 1.R.C.P.
Rule 56
Affidavit of Lesa Darlene Horrocks in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Alan Smith in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Brent L. Grigg in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment;
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment Pursuant to 1.R.C.P. Rule 56
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment;
Affidavit of Delwyn Mickelsen
Affidavit of Justin Hokanson
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I.

01-24-2011

J.
K.

02-02-2011
02-02-2011

7.

I certify:
(a)

Defendants' Reply Briefto Plaintiffs Memorandum and Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment
Judgment

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below:
Sheila Fish, Court Reporter
c/o District Court Clerk
624 E Center, Room 218
Pocatello, ID 83201

(b)( 1) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c)( 1) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid.
(d)(l) That the Appellant's filing fee has been paid.
(e)

DATED this

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

<~ay of March, 2011.

/

.I

/GARYL. COOPER

/

l

NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 3

84

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
the foregoing to:

~ay of March, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of
[ ~.S.mail
[]
Express mail
[ ] -- Hand delivery
[]
Fax: 234-2961

Aaron N. Thompson
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
216 W Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370

[~.mail

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
District Judge
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E Center, Room 220
Pocatello, ID 83201
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Express mail
Hand delivery
Fax: 236-7012

Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar # 1814
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
)
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES )
INC.,
)
)
Defendants
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2010-02757-0C

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDUM FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS

COMES NOW Mickelsen Construction, Inc., by and through its attorney of record Gary L.
Cooper and submits the following:
1. Mickelsen Construction, Inc. submits that I. C. § 12-120(3) governs the award of attorney
fees in this case because this was an action on a guaranty.
2. Because counsel for Plaintiff had both a paralegal and an associate available to work on
this case, counsel should not have charged for proof reading motions and affidavits. Plaintiff objects
to the proofreading charges totaling $869.50 as identified on the highlighted copy ofthe bill attached
as Exhibit "A" to this objection.

."CS~w

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUMltPR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - PAGE I

3. The charge for copies/fax costs totaling $36.70 is not a cost as a matter of right and is not
a discretionary cost which can be awarded in this case. Therefore, the expenses totaling $36.70
should be stricken.
DATED this 7th day of March, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of March, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to:

[ / u.S. mail

Aaron N. Thompson
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
216 W Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello,ID 83204-0370

[]
[]
[]

Express mail
Hand delivery
Fax: 234-2961

[~.mail

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
District Judge
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E Center, Room 220
Pocatello,ID 83201

[]
[]

[1

Express mail
Hand delivery
Fax: 236-7012
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Date: 02/11/2011

Detail Transaction File List

Page: 1

.t1ay, Rammell & Thompson, Charter
Trans
Date

Atty

Rate

Hours
to Bill

Amount

Fees
09/3012010
09/3012010
09/3012010
1010212010
10105/2010

6
6
6
6
6

185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00

0.50
,0.50
0.50
0.10
0.20

35.00
92.50
92.50
18.50
37.00

10105/2010
10/12/2010

6
6

185.00
185.00

0.50
0.20

10/13/2010

6

185.00

0.20

10/14/2010
10/15/2010
10/15/2010
10/15/2010
10/18/2010
10/18/2010

6
6
6
6
6
6

185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00.

1.00
0.50
0.30
2.00
0.20
0.50

10/19/2010
10/2012010
10120/2010
10/2012010
10/20/2010

6
6
6
6
6

185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00

0.20
0.50
0.50
0.10
0.50

10122/2010

6

185.00

0.10

10/2212010
10125/2010
10/25/2010
10/26/2010

6
6
6
6

185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00

0.30
0.20
0.20
0.20

10128/2010
10128/2010
10128/2010

6
6
6

185.00
185.00
185.00

0.20
0.20
0.50

10128/2010

6

185.00

0.20

10/29/2010

6

185.00

0.50

10129/2010
10129/2010

6
12

185.00
100.00

0.20
0.50

10129/2010

12

100.00

0.20

11/12/2010
11/15/2010
11/1712010
11/18/2010

6
6
6
6

185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00

0.50
0.30
0.10
0.20

Conference with Client. Billed @ $35.00
Review Complaint and Documents.
Review Statute of Frauds.
Telephone Call: Penrod.
Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re:
Discovery.
92.50 Review Discovery Response.
37.00 Review Documents from Opposing
Attorney.
Instructions to Legal Assistant.
37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re:
Discovery.
185.00 Draft Motion for Summary Judgment.
92.50 Draft Affidavit.
55.50 Draft Motion.
370.0Q-Draft Affidavit.
37.00 Review Affidavit.
92.50 Proofread Motion for Summary
Judgment.
37.00 Proofread Affidavit.
. 92.50 Proofread Affidavit of Grigg.
92.50 Proofread Affidavit of Smith.
18.50 E-mail to client..
92.50 Proofread memo for Summary
Judgment.
18.50 Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re:
Affidavit.
55.50 Proofread Memo.
37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant.
37.00 Proofread Grigg Affidavit.
37.00 Review Documents.
Instructions to Legal Assistant.
37.00 E-mail to client..
37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant.
92.50 Proofread Memo for Summary
Judgment.
37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re:
Summary Judgment.
92.50 Proofread Affidavit and Motion for
Summary Judgment.
37.00 Letter to Opposing Attorney.
50.00 Review and correct Motion for Summary
Judgment.
20.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant.
Conference with Aaron.
92.50 Prepare for Hearing.
55.50 Attend Hearing.
18.50 Instructions to Legal Assistant.
37.00 E-mail to client..
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Date: 02/11/2011

Detail Transaction File list

Page: 2

, Rammell &Thompson, Ch
Trans
Date

Atty

Rate

Hours
to Bill

Amount

11/22/2010
11/24/2010
12/01/2010
12/0212010
12/0212010

6
6
6
10
6

185.00
185.00
185.00
75.00
185.00

0.10
0.30
0.30
0.20
0.20

18.50
55.50
55.50
15.00
37.00

01/18/2011

6

185.00

0.50

92.50

01/19/2011

6

185.00

0.20

37.00

01/20/2011
01/20/2011
01/21/2011
01/24/2011
01/31/2011
01/31/2011

6
6
6
6
6
6

185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00
185.00

1.00
1.00
0.50
0.50
1.00
0.50

185.00
185.00
92.50
92.50
185.00
92.50

02/03/2011

6

185.00

0.50

92.50

02/04/2011

6

185.00

0.20

37.00

E-mail to client..
Strategy.
E-mail to and from client..
Draft Notice of Hearing.
Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re:
Notice.
Review Summary Judgment Memo.
Letter to client.
Review Affidavit of Justin H.
Letter to client.
Draft Reply Memo.
Work on Summary Judgment.
Proofread Memo.
Proofread reply brief.
Prepare for Hearing.
Prepare for Hearing.
Attend Hearing.
Review Order.
Letter to client.
Telephone Call to Client.

6
6
6
6
6
6

1.000
1.000
0.150
1.000
0.150
0.150

3.00
4.00
17.55
6.00
1.50
4.65

FAX
FAX
Copy expense
FAX
Copy expense
Copy expense

Fees

Expenses
10/15/2010
10/27/2010
10/29/2010
10/29/2010
12/31/2010
01/31/2011

Billable

3,708.70

20.60

Friday 0211112011 4:06 pm
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C

vs.

JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
INC.,
Defendant.

This matter came for hearing based on Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees pursuant
to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Aaron N. Thompson of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson
Chartered, was present for Defendants, and Javier L. Gabiola of Cooper & Larsen Law Office
was present for the Plaintiffs. Argument was held on May 2, 2011, at approximately 2:00 p.m.
At the onset of the hearing, Plaintiff conceded that Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applied, and
therefore, Defendants were entitled to attorney's fees as a matter of right. The Court found that
the costs requested in the Motion were usual and customary, but not extraordinary, and therefore
omitted. The Court deemed, in its discretion, that the fees objected to in Plaintiff s Objection
were excludable.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed:
1. That Defendants shall have a Judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of $2,802.50

as of May 2, 2011;
2. That said Judgment will carry the legal rate of interest of 5.375%, simple interest, per
annum until recovered.
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DATED this

~OfMay,2011

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Judgment for Attorney's Fees was
served on the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.

[11"

Aaron N. Thompson
May, Rarnmell & Thompson, Chtd
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204

u.s. Mail
[] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

Gary L. Cooper
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[ (u.s. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

DATED this ~day of May, 2011
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTIONS,

INC.,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES,
INC. ,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.
38634-2011
Bannock County
Court No.
2010-2757

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Bannock, Stephen S. Dunn,
District Judge, presiding.

LODGED at the

B~nnock

County

Courthouse in Pocatello,
Idaho, this ~ day of

~
----

0'

,2011, at
clock

.m.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

)

Supreme Court No. 38534-2011

)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)

LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
INC.,
Defendants-Respondents,

)
)
)
)

-------------------------)
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock,do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate
Rules.
I do further certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification or
admitted into evidence during the course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this ""'--__'- day of

(Seal)

, 2011.

DALE HATCH, _~~~_~~
/?~~~Cferk of the District c;Ourt c:::::~~,
(,
Bannocf<Couflt¥,~-lga 0 Supreme Court

"

,,',

'~:t·'=~-:~

Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICf OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BANNOCK

MICKELSEN CONSTRUmON, INC.

)
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES
)
INC.,
)
Defendants-Respondents, )

Supreme Court No. 38534-2011

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-------------------------)
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of
Record in this cause as follows:
Gary L. Cooper
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
Post Office Box 4229
Pocatello, Id 83205-4229

Aaron N. Thompson
May,

RammeU~& Thompson,

Chartered

Post Office Box 370
Pocatello, Id 83204-0370

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this-=-=

(Seal)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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, 2011.

